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SECURITIES LAW-THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934-
'ROUND AND 'ROUND WE GO: THE SUPREME COURT AGAIN LIMITS
THE CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH FEDERAL COURTS MAY HOLD
SECONDARY ACTORS LIABLE UNDER SECTION 10(B) AND SEC
RULE 10B-5. STONERIDGE INVESTMENT PARTNERS, LLC v.
SCIENTIFIC-A TLANTA, INC., 128 S. CT. 761 (2008).
I. INTRODUCTION
Few areas in the field of securities law are as controversial or as
complex as implied rights of action under section 10(b) of the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934' ("Exchange Act") and Securities and Ex-
change Commission (SEC) Rule 10b-5,2 its regulatory counterpart.' In
recent years, the spectacular downfall of corporate giants such as
Enron, Worldcom, Sunbeam, Waste Management, and Xerox has
inspired plaintiffs to flood the federal courts with securities fraud
claims arising under section 10(b) of the Exchange Act.' Over the last
few decades, the plaintiffs' bar-desperate to find deep pockets for
recovery-has developed new, creative theories of liability designed to
alleviate or even circumvent the inflexible elements necessary to es-
tablish a private right of action against secondary actors in the United
States' securities markets.6 These theories have further added to the
existing complexity of section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and SEC
Rule 10b-5.7
Presumably sympathetic to the plight of defrauded investors,
lower federal courts have historically accepted a number of alternative
theories of recovery under section 10(b), thereby allowing class-action
plaintiffs to recover vast sums of money from secondary actors that
help issuing companies mislead investors-even if the secondary ac-
tors did not themselves violate section 10(b) or SEC Rule 10b-5.' Over
1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78mm (2000).
2. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2008).
3. Edward A. Fallone, Section 10 and the Vagaries of Federal Common Law: The
Merits of Codifying the Private Cause of Action Under a Structuralist Approach, 1997
U. ILL. L. REv. 71, 71 (1997).
4. Larry E. Ribstein, Market vs. Regulatory Responses to Corporate Fraud: A
Critique of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 28 J. CORP. L. 1, 2 (2002).
5. See Fallone, supra note 3, at 75. "As the years have passed.., certain seg-
ments of the plaintiffs' bar have discharged their function as private attorneys... with
a zeal bordering upon obsession." Fallone, supra note 3, at 75.
6. See infra Part II.E.
7. See infra Part II.E.
8. See S. Scott Luton, The Ebb and Flow of Section 10 Jurisprudence: An Analy-
sis of Central Bank, 17 U. ARK. LIrLE ROCK L.J. 45, 46-47 (1994).
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the last two decades, this approach has conflicted with the Supreme
Court's view of implied private rights of action under section 10(b). 9
Beginning with the Rehnquist Court in 1972, the Supreme Court has
systematically narrowed the reach of liability under section 10(b) and
SEC Rule 10b-5.'0
On January 15, 2008, in Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v.
Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., the Supreme Court addressed the plaintiffs'
bar's most recent theory for recovery against secondary actors under
section 10(b): "scheme liability., 12 Rejecting the theory as beyond the
scope of liability intended by Congress, the Court sharply narrowed
the circumstances under which courts may hold secondary actors lia-
ble under section 10(b) and SEC Rule 10b-5.3 Although the holding in
Stoneridge represents a victory for secondary actors in the United
States' securities markets and given the history of federal courts in
relaxing the Supreme Court's strict statutory approach," it is likely
that the plaintiffs' bar will develop fresh, novel theories designed to
circumvent the stringent elements necessary to establish an implied
private right of action against secondary actors under section 10(b)
and SEC Rule 10b-5.5 Thus, the holding in Stoneridge is not likely to
dam the flood of securities litigation that is currently permeating
through the federal court system. 6
This note begins by providing a background of securities fraud lit-
igation under section 10(b) and SEC Rule 10b-5.17 Next, it examines
the facts and reasoning of the Court's holding in Stoneridge Investment
Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc.18 Finally, this note discusses
the significance of Stoneridge and predicts the impact the case may
have on future securities litigation under section 10(b) and SEC Rule
10b-5.19
9. Id. (stating that the "relationship between the courts has created an ebb and
flow of section 10(b) jurisprudence, both expanding and restricting the scope of liabili-
ty under the provision.")
10. M. Ridgway Barker, Richard L. Baum, John J. Jenkins, Gregory G. Ballard,
Thomas E. Redburn & Bahram Seyedin-Noor, An Immediate Look at the Legal, Go-
vernmental, and Economic Ramifications of Stoneridge Investment Partners v. Scien-
tific Atlanta, 2008 ASPATORE INSTANT AWARENESS 5.
11. 128 S. Ct. 761 (2008).
12. Id. at 770.
13. Id. at 771-72.
14. Luton, supra note 8, at 46-47.
15. See infra Part IV.C.
16. See infra Part IV.C.
17. See infra Part II.
18. See infra Part III.




In 1907, a financial panic erupted in the United States after inves-
tors lost confidence in many New York banks.' Investors believed
that the banks were part of a group of stock market operators who
were financially devastated after the stock of a copper mining compa-
ny they controlled plummeted.21 This led to a dramatic decrease in
prices on the New York Stock Exchange, which, in turn, led to a run
on the banks.2 3 By the time investors regained their confidence in the
financial markets, a recession cloaked the American economy.'
The drastic downturn in the market forced many banks to shut
their doors, and numerous small investors were financially destroyed.24
Citizens overwhelmingly believed that the stock operators and banks
stood to gain from the collapse in prices and, believing that the price
decreases precipitated the panic, the public called for government in-
tervention.2 Scholars generally regard the panic of 1907 as the begin-
ning of the movement for public control over the stock exchanges.26
Although the government took no action to regulate the stock ex-
changes for another two decades, the panic of 1907 proved to be the
stepping stone for future governmental regulation of the securities
markets.
This section first addresses the general background of federal se-
curities law and the passage of the Exchange Act.' It then discusses
section 10(b) of the Exchange Act-an anti-fraud provision-and the
SEC's implementation of Rule 10b-5. 29 This section also addresses pri-
vate rights of action for suits under section 10(b) of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 and SEC Rule 10b-5.30 Next, this section discusses
the holding of Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Den-
20. Steve Thel, The Original Conception of Section 10(b) of the Securities Ex-
change Act, 42 STAN. L. REv. 385, 395 (1990).
21. Id.
22. Id. A "run on the bank" occurs when a large number of investors withdraw
their deposits from a bank in fear that the bank is insolvent. Wikipedia, Bank Run,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Run-on the bank (last visited on March 18, 2008).
23. Thel, supra note 20, at 395.
24. Thel, supra note 20, at 395.
25. Thel, supra note 20, at 395.
26. Thel, supra note 20, at 395.
27. See generally Thel, supra note 20.
28. See infra Part II.A.
29. See infra Part II.B.
30. See infra Part II.C.
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ver,3 1 an important case in which the Supreme Court rejected an im-
plied right of action under section 10(b) and SEC Rule 10b-5 for aid-
ing and abetting liability." Finally, this section lays out the various
alternative theories of primary liability under section 10(b) of the Ex-
change Act which are used by lower federal courts in the wake of Cen-
tral Bank.33
A. Lead Up to and Passage of the Exchange Act
This section discusses both the passage and the purpose of the
Exchange Act. Following the panic of 1907, the American economy
regained its footing and the stock market grew rapidly. As a result,
calls for government intervention in the securities markets quieted33
until the stock market crashed in 1929.36
Prior to the 1930s the federal government left regulation of the
security markets solely to the state.3' In the wake of the 1929 stock
market crash, however, Congress passed expansive securities reform
that provided for federal regulation of the securities markets.3 8 The
two key pieces of legislation that were passed were the Securities Act
of 193339 and the Exchange Act.4° Following the stock market crash of
1929, the Great Depression devastated the American economy.4' Con-
gress was motivated, in part, to pass the Exchange Act due to the
Great Depression's devastating economic and sociological effects and
because it believed the Great Depression was the product of abuse in
the securities markets.4' The tremendous boom in the stock market
31. 511 U.S. 164 (1994).
32. See infra Part II.D.
33. See infra Part II.E.
34. Thel, supra note 20, at 406-07.
35. Thel, supra note 20, at 407. "Securities legislation has historically been the
product of calamity." Thel, supra note 20, at 407.
36. James D. Gordon III, Acorns and Oaks: Implied Rights of Action Under the
Securities Acts, 10 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 62, 64 (2004).
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (2000).
40. Gordon III, supra note 36, at 64. This note will not delve into a discussion of
the Securities Act of 1933, as it bears little on post-distribution securities fraud. The
Securities Act of 1933 concerns itself with the securities distribution process, while the
Exchange Act governs the post-distribution period. 1 Louis Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN,
SECURITIES REGULATION 226 (3d ed. 1989).
41. Thel, supra note 20, at 407-10.
42. Gordon III, supra note 36, at 64. After the crash in 1929, rumors began to
spread-as was the case in the panic of 1907-that bankers were short-selling shares
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leading up to the 1929 crash, coupled with the sharp decline in prices
that accompanied the crash, led many to think that speculation rather
than sensible investment strategies was the force driving the securities
markets.4 3 In the grips of the Great Depression, many believed-and
Congress agreed-that the survival of the American economy de-
pended on placing a stranglehold on speculation in the securities mar-
kets.'
The stock market crash of 1929 was important broadly in the
sense in that it shaped public and congressional perceptions of the
securities markets."5 Much of the current securities law commentary
stems from the notion that stock prices reflect the public's perception
of issuing companies and that stock prices will portray those percep-
tions more accurately if better and more accurate information is avail-
able to the marketplace. 6
In accordance with this notion, the fundamental purpose of the
Exchange Act was to steer away from the philosophy of caveat emp-
tor '7 and toward a philosophy of full disclosure." By promoting full
disclosure, the Exchange Act increased investor confidence by ensur-
ing honest securities markets.49 Although full disclosure was Con-
gress's primary purposes, the Exchange Act also sought to rid the se-
at the first sign that the market was collapsing. Thel, supra note 20, at 410. "Short-
selling" refers to a practice by which investors contract to sell shares they do not yet
own in hopes of buying the shares in the future at a lower price. Wikipedia, Short
(finance), http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ShortIsell (last visited March 18, 2008). "Short-
sellers" use this practice when they believe that the value of a stock will decline. Thel,
supra note 20, at 40.
43. Thel, supra note 20, at 410.
44. Thel, supra note 20, at 410. The congressional committee investigating the
stock market crash "unanimously and unequivocally condemned both speculation and
manipulation as serious problems which had contributed significantly to the depres-
sion." Thel, supra note 20, at 423.
45. Thel, supra note 20, at 409.
46. Thel, supra note 20, at 409.
47. "Caveat Emptor" is a Latin phrase meaning "let the buyer beware" and is "[a]
doctrine holding that purchasers buy at their own risk." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
236 (8th ed. 2004).
48. Thel, supra note 20, at 409; See also Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United
States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972). "[The] fundamental purpose [of the Exchange Act
was] to substitute a philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emptor
and thus to achieve a high standard of business ethics in the secured industry." Affi-
liated Ute, 406 U.S. at 151 (quoting SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S.
180, 186 (1963)).
49. United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 658 (1997).
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curities markets of fraudulent activity by effectively regulating the
markets °
B. The Anti-Fraud Provisions Under the Exchange Act
Consistent with its intent to rid the securities markets of fraud
and speculation, Congress included in the Exchange Act section
10(b) 51-a very broad, far-reaching anti-fraud provision. This section
first lays out the statutory requirement of section 10(b) of the Ex-
change Act. Next, this section addresses SEC Rule 10b-5, a regulation
enacted by the SEC pursuant to express authority given in section
10(b).
Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act makes it unlawful
for any person, directly or indirectly,... [t]o use or employ, in con-
nection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a na-
tional securities exchange[,] . . any manipulative or deceptive de-
vice or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations
as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in
the public interest or for the protection of investors. 3
Congress structured the text of section 10(b) solely as an enabling
provision.- By itself, the text prohibits nothing." Rather, Congress
chose to delegate its implementation and interpretation to the SEC.56
Subsequently, the SEC, in accordance with the statutory powers
granted to it by section 10(b), promulgated Rule 10b-5.7 SEC Rule
10b-5 states:
50. Loss & Seligman, supra note 40, at 226. The purpose of the Exchange Act was
"to prevent and afford remedies for fraud in securities trading and manipulation of
the markets; to regulate the securities markets; and to control the amount of the Na-
tion's credit that goes into those markets." Loss & Seligman, supra note 40, at 226.
51. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j(b) (West 2000).
52. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 203 (1976) (stating that this "sec-
tion was described rightly as a 'catchall' clause to enable the Commission 'to deal with
new manipulative (or cunning) devices.').
53. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j(b).
54. Elizabeth A. Nowicki, 10(b) or Not 10(b)?: Yanking the Security Blanket for
Attorneys in Securities Litigation, 2004 COLuM. Bus. L. REv. 637, 677-78 (2004).
55. Id.
56. Id. at 677-78, 678 n.172 (noting that the vagueness and deference was delibe-
rate).
57. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2008).
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It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use
of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the
mails or of any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements
made, in the light of circumstances under which they were made,
not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which op-
erates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
58
According to the express provisions of both section 10(b) and
SEC Rule 10b-5, neither Congress nor the SEC provided a private
right of action for plaintiffs injured by securities fraud.59 Nevertheless,
the Exchange Act contained eight other provisions that expressly pro-
vided for private rights of action.' Thus, it is generally accepted that
Congress did not originally intend to provide for a private right of ac-
tion under section 10(b).6" Indeed, at the time of its implementation,
the SEC believed that Rule 10b-5 would be used merely as an en-
forcement tool.6"
C. Private Rights of Action Under Section 10(b) and SEC Rule 10b-5
Although neither section 10(b) nor Rule 10b-5 provided for a pri-
vate right of action for plaintiffs injured by securities fraud, federal
courts subsequently implied such a right from the text of the statute
58. Id.
59. Gordon III, supra note 36, at 65.
60. Gordon III, supra note 36, at 64.
61. Joseph A. Grundfest, Disimplying Private Rights of Action Under the Federal
Securities Laws: The Commission's Authority, 107 HARV. L. REV. 961, 976 (1994)
(stating that the implied private right of action under section 10(b) was "entirely un-
planned by Congress when it enacted [s]ection 10(b)").
62. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730 (1975). "[T]here is
no indication that the Commission in adopting Rule lob-5 considered the question of
private civil remedies under this provision." Id. (citing Birnbaum v. Newport Steel
Corp., 193 F.2d 461, 463 (2d Cir. 1952)). "The rule's history... makes it abundantly
clear that, as of the time of its adoption, 'nobody at the Commission table gave any
indication that he was remotely thinking of civil liability."' Grundfest, supra note 61,




and issued thousands of opinions attempting to define the right.63 This
section first discusses the judicial creation of the implied right of ac-
tion under section 10(b).(' Next, the section discusses the elements
necessary to establish an implied private right of action under section
10(b), focusing primarily on the element of reliance.65 Finally, this sec-
tion outlines the judicial expansion of implied private rights of action
under section 10(b) from primary to secondary actors-namely, aiders
and abettors.66
1. The Judicial Creation of a Private Right of Action Under Sec-
tion 10(b) for Primary Violators
One can trace the creation of implied private rights of action un-
der federal statutes back to 1916.67 In Texas & Pacific Railway Com-
pany v. Rigsby,6' the United States Supreme Court held that although
a federal statute implemented to improve employee safety failed to
provide for an express private right of action, the statute conferred
upon the employee an implied private right of action to recover under
the statute.69 Citing common law, the court stated, "in every case,
where a statute enacts or prohibits a thing for the benefit of a person,
he shall have a remedy upon the same statute for the thing enacted for
his advantage, or for the recompense of a wrong done to him."
7
1
In 1946, just four years after the implementation of SEC Rule 10-
5, a federal district court in Pennsylvania recognized an implied pri-
vate right of action for plaintiffs to sue under section 10(b) and SEC
Rule 10b-5.7 1 In Kardon v. National Gypsum Co.,72 the plaintiffs sought
to recover damages under section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and SEC
Rule 10b-5.73 The plaintiffs in the case claimed that the defendants'
misrepresentations and suppressions of truth induced the plaintiffs to
sell stock at less than fair market value.7 ' Although the court recog-
63. Gordon III, supra note 36, at 62.
64. See infra Part II.C.1.
65. See infra Part II.C.2.
66. See infra Part II.C.3.
67. Tex. & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33 (1916).
68. Id.
69. Id. at 38-40.
70. Id.at 39. The court cited to the common law maxim of ubi jus ibi remedium.
Id. at 39-40.
71. Kardon v. Nat'l Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 513-14 (E.D. Penn. 1946).
72. 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Penn. 1946).




nized that neither section 10(b) nor SEC Rule lOb-5 expressly pro-
vided for a private right of action,75 it stated that "[t]he disregard of
the command of a statute is a wrongful act and a tort. 7 6 Relying on
common law tort principles,' the court held that "the mere omission
of an express provision for civil liability [was] not sufficient to negative
what the general law implie[d]."78 Thus, the court became the first fed-
eral court to recognize the existence of an implied private right of ac-
tion under section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and SEC Rule 10b-5.79
Subsequent to Kardon, many other federal courts adopted its
holding.' As one commentator put it, "Rule 10b-5 ... spawned a mas-
sive, intricate, ever-expanding federal jurisprudence that was entirely
unplanned by Congress when it enacted [s]ection 10(b) and by the
Commission when it adopted Rule 10b-5."81 Roughly three decades
after Kardon, federal courts widely regarded the implied private right
of action under section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and SEC Rule 10b-
5 as a legitimate avenue for recovery for individuals injured by securi-
ties fraud.'
If there was any doubt, however, as to the legitimacy of the im-
plied right of action under section 10(b) and SEC Rule 10b-5, the Su-
75. Id. at 513. The court addressed the defendants' argument that other provi-
sions in the Exchange Act expressly provided for private rights of action. Id. at 514. In
effect, the defendants argued that the omission of a private right of action was evi-
dence of Congress's intent not to provide a private right of action for plaintiffs injured
by securities fraud. Id. Nevertheless, the court dismissed the argument, stating that
only part of the issue was statutory construction. Id. The court stated that the real
issue was "whether an intention [could] be implied to deny a remedy and to wipe out
a liability which, normally, by virtue of basic principles of tort law[,] accompanies" a
prohibited act. Id.
76. Id. at 513.
77. Id. at 514. The court relied on section 286 of the Restatement, Second, of
Torts, which states that:
The violation of a legislative enactment by doing a prohibited act, or by
failing to do a required act, makes the actor liable for an invasion of an in-
terest of another if: (a) the intent of the enactment is exclusively or in part
to protect an interest of the other as an individual; and (b) the interest in-
vaded is one which the enactment is intended to protect.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 286 (1965).
78. Kardon, 69 F. Supp. at 514.
79. Id. at 513-14.
80. See Gordon III; supra note 36, at 68. Since Kardon, "the federal courts have
issued thousands of decisions defining the scope of ... private right[s] of action" un-
der Rule 10b-5. Gordon III, supra note 36, at 62.
81. Grundfest, supra note 61, at 976.
82. Gordon III, supra note 36, at 68.
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preme Court resolved the issue in 1971.83 In Superintendent of Insur-
ance of the State of New York v. Bankers Life and Casualty Co.,' the
Supreme Court stated in a footnote to its opinion that "[i]t is now es-
tablished that a private right of action is implied under [section]
10(b)." Since Superintendent, the Supreme Court has routinely af-
firmed the existence of the implied right of action under section 10(b)
and SEC Rule 10b-5, and the right now serves as a "linchpin" of fed-
eral securities laws." 86 Thus, although section 10(b) of the Exchange
Act was originally intended as merely an enabling provision designed
to delegate the enforcement power and interpretation of securities
fraud to the SEC, the judiciary-exercising power from common law
tort theory-effectively expanded enforcement power of section 10(b)
to private citizens injured by securities fraud.'
2. Elements Necessary to Establish an Implied Private Right of
Action Under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5
After the holding in Kardon, federal courts issued thousands of
opinions defining the scope of the implied private right of action un-
der section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and SEC Rule 10b-5. 8 This sec-
tion briefly lays out the elements necessary to establish an implied
right of action under section 10(b) and SEC Rule 10b-5, paying partic-
ular attention to the most litigated and, therefore, the most important
element of implied rights of private action under section 10(b) and
SEC Rule 10b-5: reliance.
Although the judiciary originally expanded the enforcement me-
chanism of section 10(b) by providing for an implied private right of
action to plaintiffs injured by primary violators of SEC Rule 10b-5, the
United States Supreme Court derived the elements necessary to estab-
lish an implied private right of action from both the federal judiciary
and from Congress.89 Piecing together various Supreme Court prece-
dents with a congressionally mandated economic loss requirement,"
83. Superintendent of Ins. of State of N.Y. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6,
13 n.9 (1971).
84. 404 U.S. 6 (1971).
85. Id. at 13 n.9.
86. Grundfest, supra note 61, at 976.
87. See infra Part 11.3.1.
88. Gordon III, supra note 6, at 62.
89. Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341-42 (2005).
90. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(4) (2000). Section 78u-4(b)(4) states "[i]n any private
action arising under this [chapter] the plaintiff shall have the burden of proving that
the act or omission of the defendant alleged to violate this [chapter] caused the loss
[Vol. 31
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the Court in Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo9' laid out six ele-
ments necessary to establish an implied private right of action under
section 10(b) and SEC Rule 10b-5.92 To establish a private right of ac-
tion, the plaintiff must meet the following six elements: "(1) a material
misrepresentation (or omission); (2) scienter, i.e., a wrongful state of
mind; (3) a connection with the purchase or sale of a security, (4) re-
liance.. .; (5) economic loss; and (6) 'loss causation."'93
The reliance requirement is a purely subjective element.94 Unlike
materiality-which is the objective counterpart to the reliance re-
quirement-in order to meet the reliance requirement, a plaintiff must
prove "that it actually based its decisions upon the defendants' miss-
tatements or omissions. 'Reliance is a causa sine qua non, a type of
'but for' requirement: had the investor known the truth he would not
have acted." 95 The requirement ensures that a causal connection exists
between the defendant's misrepresentation and the plaintiff's injury.'
For plaintiffs dealing directly with defendants in suits under sec-
tion 10(b) and SEC Rule 10b-5, the reliance requirement is not a for-
midable obstacle.97 Plaintiffs simply must prove that they considered a
misrepresented fact, and that they relied upon that misrepresented
fact when entering into a securities transaction.98 In the current securi-
ties market, however, the traditional theory of reliance has proven to
be of little help to defrauded investors because of the vast number of
players that assist in issuing financial statements.99
for which the plaintiff seeks to recover damages." Id. The Exchange Act contains
eight provisions that expressly provide for private rights of action. Gordon, supra note
36, at 65.
91. 544 U.S. 336 (2005).
92. Id. at 341-342.
93. Id. (citations and original emphasis omitted); see also In re Great At. & Pac.
Tea Co. Sec. Litig., 103 Fed. Appx. 465,468 (3d Cir. 2004); Adams v. Kinder-Morgan,
Inc., 340 F.3d 1083, 1095 (10th Cir. 2003).
94. Nathenson v. Zonagen Inc., 267 F.3d 400, 413 (5th Cir. 2001).
95. Id. (quoting Abell v. Potomac Ins., Co., 858 F.2d 1104, 1117-18 (5th Cir. 1988)
(quoting Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534, 549 (5th Cir. 1981)).
96. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S 224, 243 (1988).
97. Ann Morales Olazabal, Analyst and Broker-Dealer Liability Under 10(B) for
Biased Stock Recommendations, 1 N.Y.U. J. L. & Bus. 1, *50 (LEXIS 2004).
98. Id.
99. Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 907 (9th Cir. 1975) (stating that the reliance
requirement "imposes an unreasonable.., burden" on plaintiffs).
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3. Judicial Expansion of Private Rights of Action Under Section
10(B) and SEC Rule lOb-5 to Aiding and Abetting Liability
At the time Congress enacted the securities laws, secondary lia-
bility was well established in civil common law.'" Therefore, it is rea-
sonable to assume that Congress was aware of the doctrine when it
enacted the Exchange Act.10 ' Nevertheless, just as Congress failed to
provide for a private right of action for primary violations, neither
section 10(b) nor SEC Rule 10b-5 expressly provides for a private
right of action for plaintiffs injured by secondary actors."2 The federal
courts, however, again applied concepts of common law tort theory to
expand private rights of action for securities fraud under section 10(b)
and SEC Rule 10b-5 to one class of secondary actors: aiders and abet-
tors.03 This section first defines secondary liability, then it outlines the
judicial creation of a private right of action under section 10(b) and
SEC Rule 10b-5 for aiders and abettors.
Secondary liability is defined in terms of duty." An actor who vi-
olates a duty imposed by statute is the primary violator." But, due to
the vast number of actors involved with the issuance and sale of secur-
ities, the concept of duty can be quite complex."° Consequently, in
certain situations it may be difficult to distinguish between the primary
and secondary violators. 7 One commentator stated that "[t]he key
distinction between a primary and a secondary violator is that the
primary violator does the central act proscribed by the statute or rule
while the secondary violator assists or supports the violator's act or is
liable for the act through a relationship with the violator.
'" 10 8
"Aiding and abetting" liability is a term used in securities cases to
describe secondary liability for those actors who participate with the
primary actor in the violation of securities laws."° Aiding and abetting
100. William H. Kuehnle, Secondary Liability Under the Federal Securities Laws-
Aiding and Abetting Conspiracy, Controlling Person, and Agency: Common-Law
Principles and the Statutory Scheme, 14 J. CORP. L. 313,316 (1989).
101. Id. at 316.
102. Id. at 321-22.
103. See infra notes 119-28.
104. Kuehnle, supra note 100, at 318.
105. Kuehnle, supra note 100, at 318.
106. Kuehnle, supra note 100, at 318. "Securities transactions usually are more
complex than the physical harms that are subject of most tort actions and thus greater
difficulties can occur in applying secondary liability." Kuehnle, supra note 100, at 318.
107. Kuehnle, supra note 100, at 318.
108. Kuehnle, supra note 100, at 318-19 (noting that "the distinction is recognized
in tort law, agency law, and criminal law").
109. Kuehnle, supra note 100, at 320-21.
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is encompassed within the common law concept of joint tortfeasor
liability."0 Although neither Congress nor the SEC provided for an
express private right of action for aiding and abetting liability under
section 10(b) and SEC Rule 10b-5, federal courts, consistent with their
tendency to enlarge the scope of liability under the Exchange Act,
implied a private right of action to aiders and abettors."'
Prior to Kardon and the promulgation of SEC Rule 10b-5, in Se-
curities Exchange Commission v. Timetrust, Inc.,12 the District Court
for the Northern District of California granted a request by the SEC
to enjoin aiders and abettors under the Securities Act of 1933."' While
the suit did not seek civil damages-and thus did not directly address
private rights of action for aiding and abetting liability under either
the Securities Act of 1933 or section 10(b) of the Exchange Act-the
court's holding was influential to later federal courts that implied a





In Timetrust, the SEC alleged that the defendants were involved
in fraudulent activities in violation of section 17(a) 6f the Securities
Act of 1933,15 an anti-fraud provision, and unless enjoined, they would
continue to aid and abet in the fraudulent activities. 6 In reaching its
decision, the court looked to the United States Criminal Code and
asserted that criminal law makes no distinction between actors who
aid and abet in the commission of a crime and the principal violator."7
Using an analogy to criminal law principles, the court held that an in-
junction was appropriate under the statute, reasoning that "[p]ersons
charged with aiding and abetting a criminal offense in violation of
[section] 17(a) may be joined as defendants, and no good reason ap-
110. Kuehnle, supra note 100, at 321.
111. Luton, supra note 8, at 46-47. Scott Luton stated, "[T]he lower federal courts
have historically tempered the harshness of the Supreme Court's strict statutory ap-
proach by adopting alternative theories of recovery. This antithetic relationship be-
tween the courts has created an ebb and flow of section 10(b) jurisprudence, both
expanding and restricting the scope of liability under the provision." Luton, supra
note 8, at 46-47.
11.2. 28 F. Supp. 34 (N.D. Cal. 1939).
113. Id. at 36.
114. See Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 673, 676 (N.D.
Ind. 1966) (citing Timetrust, 28 F. Supp. at 43).
115. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (2000). Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 mirrors
SEC Rule 10b-5 in generally prohibiting individuals from "employ[ing] any device,
scheme, or artifice to defraud" in the sale of securities. Id.
116. Timetrust, 28 F. Supp. at 36.
117. Id. at 43 (citing 18 U.S.C.A § 550 (West 2000).
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pears why this same rule should not apply in an injunctive proceed-
ing[] to restrain a violation of the same statute."...8
In 1966, twenty-seven years after Timetrust and twenty years after
Kardon, a federal district court in Indiana held that a private right of
action existed under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 against aiders and
abettors." 9 In Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Insurance Co.,n°
plaintiffs brought a class-action seeking civil damages from the defen-
dant for aiding and abetting under section 10(b) of the Exchange
Act."' The plaintiffs' complaint alleged that the defendant failed to
report the fraudulent activities of a broker firm that sold stock to the
defendant, which resulted in injury to the plaintiff.'22 Even though the
plaintiff conceded that the defendant was not primarily liable under
section 10(b) or Rule 10b-5, the plaintiff contended that the defendant
should be held liable as a secondary actor-an aider and abettor-for
failing to disclose the primary violator's fraudulent activities to the
SEC or the state securities commission.'2
In reaching its conclusion, the court stated that although neither
section 10(b) nor SEC Rule 10b-5 expressly provided for a private
cause of action for aiding and abetting, the court in Timetrust applied
section 10(b) of the Exchange Act to aiders and abettors in an injunc-
tion action twenty-seven years earlier. 4 Furthermore, the court as-
serted that implied rights of action for primary violations of section
10(b) and SEC Rule 10b-5 had become well established since the
holding in Kardon.12 Relying on general tort principles for secondary
liability-although a different Restatement section than the court in
Kardon relied upon' 26 -the court held that an implied private right of
action existed under section 10(b) and SEC Rule 10b-5 against aiders
and abettors.127 The court stated that "principles as stated in... Time-
118. Id.
119. Brennan, 259 F. Supp. at 680-81.
120. 254 F. Supp. 673 (1966).
121. Id. at 675.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 676.
125. Id. at 676.
126. See supra note 77.
127. Brennan, 259 F. Supp. at 681-82. The court relied upon section 876 of the
Restatement, Second, of Torts. Id. at 681. That section states as follows:
For harm resulting to a third person from the tortious conduct of another,
a person is liable if he... (b) knows that the other's conduct constitutes a
breach of duty and gives substantial assistance or encouragement to the
other so to conduct himself, or (c) gives substantial assistance to the other
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trust... and formulated in the Restatement of Torts surely best fulfill
the purposes of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and are a logical
and natural complement to the Kardon doctrine.""
Subsequent to the holding in Brennan, a vast number of plaintiffs
claimed an implied private right of action under section 10(b) and
SEC Rule 10b-5 against aiders and abettors 9 Furthermore, for nearly
three decades following Brennan, federal courts almost universally
recognized implied private rights of action under section 10(b) and
SEC Rule 10b-5 for aiders and abettors by relying on general tort law
governing secondary liability.130 The federal courts had thus taken sec-
tion 10(b) and SEC Rule 10b-5-neither of which were originally in-
tended to provide for private rights of action for primary viola-
tions 3 -and extended the implied private right of action to reach ai-
ders and abettors.
4. Central Bank: The End of the Road for Private Rights of Ac-
tion Under Section 10(b) and SEC Rule 10b-5 for Aiders and
Abettor
Prior to the Supreme Court's holding in Central Bank of Denver
v. First Interstate Bank of Denver,"2 every federal circuit court held
that there was an implied private right of action for aiding and abet-
ting liability under section 10(b) and SEC Rule 10b-5.133 Although the
Supreme Court twice reserved the issue of aiding and abetting liability
under the Exchange Act to lower federal courts,'34 in Central Bank the
Supreme Court directly addressed the issue.135 In a five-to-four deci-
sion, the Court held that no implied private right of action existed as
to aiders and abettors under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. 36 This sec-
in accomplishing a tortious result and his own conduct, separately consi-
dered, constitutes a breach of duty to a third person.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 (1939).
128. Brennan, 259 F. Supp. at 680.
129. See Kuehnle, supra note 100, at 321-22.
130. Kuehnle, supra note 100.
131. See supra notes 59-62.
132. 511 U.S. 164 (1994).
133. Luton, supra note 8, at 46 (stating that Central Bank "overturned established
case law in the jurisdictions of all eleven United States circuit courts of appeal").
134. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976) (reserving the issue
of whether a private right of action under section 10(b) and SEC Rule 10b-5 existed as
to aiders and abettors); see also Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375,
379 n.5 (1983).
135. Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 166-67.
136. Id. at 191-92.
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tion first outlines the facts and holding in Central Bank, and it con-
cludes by discussing the congressional response to Central Bank.
Central Bank of Denver, N.A. (Central Bank) served as an inden-
ture trustee on bond issues brought to market in both 1986 and 1989
by the Colorado Springs-Stetson Hills Public Building Authority ("the
Authority") to finance public improvements at Stetson Hills, a
planned commercial and residential development in Colorado
Springs.'37 Landowner assessment liens on over 500 acres of land se-
cured the two bond issues.'38 The bond covenants required that the fair
market value of the land securing the bond issues be worth at least
160% of the outstanding value of the principle and interest for both
bond issues.3 9 The covenants required AmWest Development
("AmWest") to deliver to Central Bank an annual report evidencing
compliance with the 160% fair market value requirement.' 4
In the annual report delivered to Central Bank that preceded the
1988 bond issue, AmWest reported that the fair market value of the
land was nearly unchanged from the 1986 appraisal.141 Soon after-
wards, however, a senior underwriter for the 1986 bonds sent Central
Bank a letter indicating that land values in the Colorado Springs area
were declining.42 Additionally, the underwriter informed Central
Bank that the appraisal in the 1988 annual report was over sixteen
months old, and he expressed concern that the 160% criterion was not
being met.' Although Central Bank's in-house appraiser concluded
that the appraisal contained in the 1988 annual report was "optimistic
considering the local real estate market," Central Bank decided to
delay independent review until after the 1988 bond issue.'"
Before an independent appraiser could review the land value, the
Authority defaulted on the 1988 bond issue.14 ' First Interstate Bank of
Denver, in conjunction with a man by the name of Jack Naber (to-
gether as Respondents), purchased $2.1 million of the 1988 bonds.1"
Following the Authority's default, Respondents sued the Authority,
the 1988 underwriter, a junior underwriter, an AmWest director, and




141. United States v. Central Bank, 511 U.S. 164, 167 (1994).
142. Id.
143. Id. at 167.
144. Id. at 167-68.




Central Bank for violations of [section] 10(b) of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934.' ', 44 Additionally, the complaint alleged that Cen-
tral Bank was liable under section 10(b) as an aider and abettor for
failing to disclose that the appraisal in the 1988 annual report was out-
dated.'4
Although the issue presented on the writ of certiorari regarded
the standard of scienter required for aiding and abetting liability under
section 10(b) and SEC Rule 10b-5, 49 the Supreme Court sua sponte
directed the parties to address the issue of the legitimacy of aiding and
abetting liability under section 10(b) and SEC Rule lOb-5"' In a five-
to-four decision, the Supreme Court held that no implied right of ac-
tion existed under section 10(b) and SEC Rule 10b-5.5
Writing for the Court, Justice Kennedy commenced his opinion
by emphasizing that strict statutory construction controlled the scope
of section 10(b). "2 Recognizing that section 10(b) prohibited only
misstatements, omissions, or the commission of a deceptive act, Justice
Kennedy rejected an extension of liability under section 10(b) to ac-
tors who merely aided in primary violations.' Justice Kennedy stated,
"We cannot amend the statute to create liability for acts that are not
themselves manipulative or deceptive within meaning of the sta-
tute." 4
The Court also addressed the petitioner's argument that Congress
intended the Exchange Act to provide for aiding and abetting liability
by including the phrase "directly or indirectly" in section 10(b).' The
147. United States v. Central Bank, 511 U.S. 164, 168 (1994).
148. Id. at 168-69. The United States District Court for the District of Colorado
granted summary judgment in favor of Central Bank. First Interstate Bank of Denver,
N.A. v. Pring, 969 F.2d 891, 893 (10th Cir. 1992). The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed. Id. at 900.
149. Luton, supra note 8, at 55-56. "Central Bank filed a writ of certiorari to the
United States Supreme Court seeking review of 'whether an indenture trustee could
be found liable as an aider-and-abettor ... based only on a showing of recklessness."'
Luton, supra note 8, at 55-56. The Tenth Circuit set forth the elements of a section
10(b) aiding and abetting claim as follows: "(1) the existence of a primary violation of
the securities law by another; (2) knowledge of the primary violation by the alleged
aider-and-abettor; and (3) substantial assistance by the alleged aider-and-abettor in
achieving the primary violation." First Interstate Bank of Denver, 969 F.2d at 898.
150. Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 508 U.S.
959, 959 (1993).
151. Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 191-92.
152. Id. at 166, 173.
153. Id. at 177-78.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 176.
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Court rejected this argument, reasoning that "aiding and abetting lia-
bility reaches persons who do not engage in the proscribed activities at
all, but who give a degree of aid to those who do."'5 6 Additionally, the
Court stated that numerous other provisions in the Exchange Act in-
cluded the language "directly or indirectly" in a way that did not im-
pose aiding and abetting liability.'57 Therefore, the Court concluded
that the language of section 10(b) failed to indicate Congress's intent
to provide for an implied right of action for aiding and abetting liabili-
ty under section 10(b).'58
The Court confirmed its reasoning by examining the reliance re-
quirement of implied private rights of action for primary violators of
section 10(b).'59 In order to establish a private right of action under
section 10(b), the plaintiff must prove that it relied upon the defen-
dant's misstatement or omission.' 6' The Court stated that "[w]ere [it]
to allow the aiding and abetting action proposed in this case, the de-
fendant could be liable without any showing that the plaintiff relied
upon the aider and abettor's statements or actions.' '16' The Court con-
cluded that allowing the circumvention of the reliance requirement
would ignore the careful limits on recovery under section 10(b) and
SEC Rule 10b-5 that were mandated by earlier cases. 62
The Court's holding in Central Bank rejected the universally rec-
ognized existence of implied rights of action for aiding and abetting
liability under section 10(b) and SEC Rule 10b-5 in federal courts.'
The Court made clear, however, that the elimination of the implied
156. Id.
157. United States v. Central Bank, 511 U.S. 164, 176 (1994) (citing 15 U.S.C. §
78g(f)(2)(C) (direct or indirect ownership of stock); 15 U.S.C. § 78i(b)(2)-(3) (direct
or indirect interest in put, call, straddle, option, or privilege); 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1)
(direct or indirect ownership); 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (direct or indirect ownership); 15
U.S.C. § 78t (direct or indirect control of person violating Act)).
158. Id. (noting that "Congress knew how to impose aiding and abetting liability
when it chose to do so."). The Court also addressed Petitioner's argument that Con-
gress's silence and inaction inferred congressional approval as to aiding and abetting
liability under section 10(b). Id. at 183-85. The Court stated that "[elven assuming,
moreover, a deeply rooted background of aiding and abetting tort liability, it [did] not
follow that Congress intended to apply that kind of liability to the private causes of
action in the securities Acts." Id. at 184. The Court concluded that "[i]n sum, it [was]
not plausible to interpret the statutory silence as tantamount to an implicit congres-
sional intent to impose [section] 10(b) aiding and abetting liability." Id. at 185.
159. Id. at 180.
160. Id. (citing Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 244,243 (1988)).
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. See Luton, supra note 8, at 46.
[Vol. 31
SECURITIES LAW
private right of action under section 10(b) for aiding and abetting lia-
bility did not mean that secondary actors were always free from liabili-
ty under the Exchange Act.'64 In order to hold a secondary actor liable
under section 10(b) and SEC Rule lOb-5, however, plaintiffs must
prove every element necessary to establish primary liability under
Rule 10b-5.'65
In 1995, just one year after the decision in Central Bank, Congress
passed the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA).' 66 The
PLSRA contained numerous provisions that addressed secondary lia-
bility.67 Rather than expressly providing for private rights of action for
aiding and abetting liability under section 10(b), however, the 1995
Amendments to the PLSRA added section 20(e) to the Exchange
Act." Section 20(e) delegated the responsibility of enforcing aiding
and abetting liability under section 10(b) to the SEC.169 Thus, Congress
did not expressly disapprove of the holding in Central Bank.7
D. Alternative Theories for Primary Liability in the Wake of Central
Bank
Traditionally, federal courts shaped the scope of liability under
federal securities laws. 7' Central Bank made it quite clear that to es-
tablish a private right of action under section 10(b) and SEC Rule 10b-
5 as to secondary actors, plaintiffs must prove that the secondary ac-
tor's conduct satisfies all of the elements necessary to establish prima-
ry liability.7 2 The Court in Central Bank, however, failed to elaborate
on the elements required to establish primary liability.'73 Thus, the
holding of Central Bank forced federal courts to readdress the cir-
cumstances under which secondary actors could be held primarily lia-
ble under section 10(b) and SEC Rule 10b-5.' Consistent with the
164. United States v. Central Bank, 511 U.S. 164, 191 (1994).
165. Id.
166. Jill E. Fisch, The Scope of Private Securities Litigation: In Search of Liability
Standards for Secondary Defendants, 99 COLUM. L. REv. 1293, 1303-04 (1999).
167. Id. at 1304.
168. Thomas 0. Gorman, Who Does the Catch-All Antifraud Provision Catch?
Central Bank, Stoneridge, and Scheme Liability in the Supreme Court, 1620 PLI/Co~u'
189, 201 (2007).
169. Id.
170. Compare United States v. Central Bank, 511 U.S. 164, 191-92 (1994) and
supra notes 166-69.
171. Fisch, supra note 166, at 1294.
172. United States v. Central Bank, 511 U.S. 164, 191 (1994).
173. Fisch, supra note 166, at 1294.
174. Fish, supra note 166, at 1299.
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federal courts' tendencies to relax the Supreme Court's strict statutory
approach,75 the federal courts again expanded the scope of liability
under section 10(b) and SEC Rule 10b-5, this time turning to alterna-
tive theories of primary liability that eased or eliminated the reliance
requirement as applied to secondary actors.
76
This section discusses three theories of primary liability available
to plaintiffs in the wake of Central Bank that were designed to circum-
vent the reliance and causation requirements of primary liability un-
der section 10(b) and SEC Rule 10b-5.'17 This section first discusses
the Affiliated Ute theory.'78 Next, this section addresses the "Fraud-on-
the-Market" theory.19 Finally, this section concludes with a discussion
of the "Scheme Liability" theory.'80
1. The Affiliated Ute Theory
The traditional element of reliance required to establish an im-
plied private right of action under section 10(b) and SEC Rule 10b-5 is
wholly subjective.' The reliance element requires that the plaintiffs
actually relied upon a defendant's misstatement or omission in the
course of buying or selling securities. In Affiliated Ute Citizens of
Utah v. United States,183 the United States Supreme Court examined
the traditional requirement of reliance and determined that, in cases
involving nondisclosure, the traditional rule was "too restrictive," and
therefore, a presumption of reliance should be afforded to plaintiffs if
the facts withheld by the defendant were material."
In Affiliated Ute, the plaintiffs sued a bank and two of its em-
ployees under SEC Rule 10b-5.5 The bank acted as a transfer agent
for stock of a corporation formed for the purpose of distributing assets
to individual members of the Ute tribe.' 6 Although the corporation's
attorney advised the bank to discourage the sale of the stock held by
175. Luton, supra note 8, at 46-47.
176. Barbara Black, Fraud on the Market: A Criticism of Dispensing with Reliance
Requirements in Certain Open Market Transactions, 62 N.C. L. REV. 435, 438 (1984).
177. See infra Part II.E.1-3.
178. See infra Part II.E.1.
179. See infra Part II.E.2.
180. See infra Part II.E.3.
181. See supra note 89-91.
182. See supra notes 94-96.
183. 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
184. Id. at 150-54.
185. Black, supra note 176, at 444.
186. Black, supra note 176, at 444.
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the corporation's stockholders, two bank employees facilitated a
scheme to transfer the stock to themselves and others, actively en-
couraged a secondary market for the stock, and precipitated the sale
of the plaintiff's stock at less than fair market value."f The Court held
that the defendants-as "market makers"-possessed an affirmative
duty to disclose to plaintiffs any material facts that would have influ-
enced the plaintiffs' decision to sell the stock.'m" Rejecting the court of
appeals' reasoning that "there was no violation of [Rule lOb-5] unless
the record disclosed evidence of reliance on material fact misrepresen-
tations""'9 the Supreme Court held that when a party possesses a duty
to disclose, lack of proof of plaintiffs' reliance is not a bar to recov-
ery.190
The Court reasoned that the fundamental purpose of the Ex-
change Act was to move from a philosophy of caveat emptor to a phi-
losophy of a full disclosure in order to inject a higher degree of integri-
ty into the security markets.'9' Thus, in light of the congressional pur-
pose of the Exchange Act, the Court stated that Rule 10b-5 should not
be read too narrowly."9 Indeed, the Court stated that although para-
graph two of Rule 10b-5 premised liability on "the making of an un-
true statement of a material fact and the omission to state a material
fact," the other two paragraphs were broader, encompassing "a
'course of business' or 'device, scheme or artifice' that operates as a
fraud" upon the plaintiffs.'9 The Court concluded that if the defendant
had a duty to disclose material facts and failed to disclose those ma-
terial facts, "[t]his obligation to disclose and this withholding of a ma-
terial fact establish[ed] the requisite element of causation in fact."'94
After Affiliated Ute, federal courts widely interpreted the holding
as eliminating the plaintiff's duty to establish the element of reliance
in nondisclosure cases.'95 Based upon the decision in Affiliated Ute,
federal courts in nondisclosure cases afforded plaintiffs a presumption
of reliance and shifted the burden to the defendants to prove that the
plaintiffs did not rely.'96
187. Affiliated Ute v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 145-48 (1972).
188. Id. at 153.
189. Id. at 152.
190. Id. at 153.
191. Id. at 151.
192. Id.
193. Affiliated Ute v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 152-53 (1972).
194. Id. at 154.
195. Black, supra note 176, at 444.
196. Id. at 444-45. Additionally, "[s]ome courts extend[ed] Affiliated Ute further




In the wake of Central Bank, the "fraud-on-the-market" theory
became another popular theory used by plaintiffs in federal courts to
circumvent the traditional element of reliance.'" Although the tradi-
tional common law reliance requirement focuses on the effect that the
misstatement or omission had on the plaintiff, the "fraud-on-the-
market" theory shifts the focus to the effect that the misstatement or
omission has on the marketplace as a whole.'"
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is generally credited
as the first court to establish the "fraud-on-the-market" theory in
1975."9 In Blackie v. Barrack," the court granted class certification to
plaintiffs who purchased the stock of a publicly traded company."'
Plaintiffs alleged that the defendants released misleading information
to the public in the form of reports to shareholders, SEC filings, and
press releases.2°2 In addressing the defendants' contention that the
plaintiffs never actually relied upon the misleading information, the
court cited Affiliated Ute for the proposition that subjective reliance is
not a critical element of claims under section 10(b) and SEC Rule 10b-
5.203 Additionally, the court held that in cases in which plaintiffs claim
injury for deceptions that inflate the prices of stock on the open mar-
ket, the reliance element-and thus, causation-is established if the
plaintiff can assert facts that prove both the context of the purchase of
the securities and the materiality of the misrepresentations.' 4 The
court stated further that investors generally rely on the fact that mar-
ket prices are valid and legitimate representations of the financial
health of the issuing company, and investors indirectly rely on the
truth of any representations made that support the price of the securi-
ties.2" The court concluded by stating that "whether he is aware of it
tiff need prove only materiality, thus eliminating the distinction between misrepresen-
tations and omissions." Id. at 445.
197. Id. at 435.
198. Francesca Muratori, The Boundaries of the "In Connection With" Require-
ment of Rule 1OB-5: Should Advertising be Actionable as Securities Fraud?, 56 Bus.
LAW. 1057, 1065-66 (2001).
199. Id. at 1066.
200. 524 F.2d 891 (9th Cir. 1975).
201. Id. at 894, 900-01.
202. Id. at 895.
203. Id. at 905 (citing Affiliated Ute, 406 U.S. at 153-54).
204. Id. at 906.
205. Id. at 907.
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or not, the price [the investor] pays reflects material misrepresenta-
tions."20
Subsequent to the holding in Blackie, lower federal courts began
to address the scope and application of the "fraud-on-the-market"
theory.2' If there was any doubt as to the legitimacy of the theory,
however, the Supreme Court resolved the issue.2n In Basic, Inc. v. Le-
vinson,209 the Supreme Court endorsed the "fraud-on-the-market
theory. 210 In facts similar to those in Blackie, the Court held that
transactions in the current securities market differed from the face-to-
face transactions typical of earlier fraud cases, and thus, the reliance
requirement under Rule 10b-5 must account for these differences.1
Citing recent studies showing that the market prices of securities re-
flected all information available to the public, the Court held that ac-
tual reliance was not necessary for purposes of a Rule 10b-5 action
where the plaintiff relied on any misrepresentations made publicly by
the defendant.2
3. "Scheme Liability"
In light of the recent waves of corporate scandals, plaintiffs' at-
torneys-motivated to find solvent defendants-created a theory that
is now known as "scheme liability."2 '3 The "scheme liability" theory
developed as a way to circumvent the requirement of a public miss-
tatement or omission, thereby requiring plaintiffs to prove only that
defendants engaged in a "scheme to defraud" that was subsequently
206. Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 907 (9th Cir. 1975). In effect, the court's
holding parallels the "efficient market" thesis. See Black, supra note 176, at 437-38.
This theory supposes that "in free and actively traded markets, stock prices will fully
reflect all available information about the corporation." Black, supra note 176, at 437-
38.
207. Muratori, supra note 198, at 1067 (citing Sanders v. Robinson Humphrey/Am.
Express, Inc., 634 F. Supp. 1048, 1063-64 (N.D. Ga. 1986); Reingold v. Deloitte
Haskins & Sells, 599 F. Supp. 1241, 1264 (S.D.N.Y. 1984)).
208. See infra notes 209-12.
209. 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
210. Id.
211. Id. at 244-45.
212. Id. at 246-48. The majority held that the presumption was rebuttable by "re-
but[ting] proof of the elements giving rise to the presumption, or [by] show[ing] that
the misrepresentation in fact did not lead to a distortion of price or that an individual
plaintiff traded or would have traded despite his knowing that the statement was
false." Id. at 248.
213. Daniel A. McLaughlin, Liability Under Rules lOb-5(a) & (c), 31 DEL. J. CORP.
L. 631, 631-32 (2006).
2008]
UALR LAW REVIEW
misrepresented by the issuing company.1 Federal circuit courts, how-
ever, were split as to the scope and legitimacy of the theory.1 In
Simpson v. AOL Time Warner Inc. , the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit adopted the theory of "scheme liability."2"7 Simpson was
a class action case involving claims that multiple actors created a frau-
dulent scheme for the purpose of inflating the revenues of an internet
218company.
The Simpson court commenced its analysis by stating that part of
the purpose of section 10(b) was to prohibit the employment of decep-
tive schemes in connection with the purchase or sale of securities.219
Noting that Central Bank mandated that liability under section 10(b)
extended only to primary violators, the court stated that primary lia-
bility may nevertheless arise by substantial participation or involve-
ment in the preparation of financial statements, even if that participa-
tion did not involve any misstatements or omissions that would have
violated section 10(b) or SEC Rule 10b-5. 20 Thus, the court stated that
the necessary inquiry was, "what conduct constitute[d] a manipulative
or deceptive act in furtherance of a scheme to defraud sufficient to
render the defendant a 'primary violator' of [section] 10(b)."221 Bor-
rowing an argument set forth by the SEC in its amicus brief, the court
concluded that,
to be liable as a primary violator of [section] 10(b) for participation
in a 'scheme to defraud,' the defendant must have engaged in con-
duct that had the principal purpose and effect of creating a false
214. Id. at 631; Gorman, supra note 168, at 208. The phrase "scheme to defraud"
does not appear in section 10(b), but does appear in Rule 10b-5, which states that it is
unlawful "to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud." 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-
5(a) (2008).
215. Compare Simpson v. AOL Time Warner Inc., 452 F.3d 1040 (9th Cir. 2006)
(adopting the theory of "scheme liability") and Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Credit
Suisse First Boston (USA) Inc., 482 F.3d 372 (5th Cir. 2007) (reversing the district
court's decision based on the theory of "scheme liability").
216. 452 F.3d 1040 (9th Cir. 2006).
217. Id. at 1043, 1048.
218. Id. at 1042. The name of the internet company was Homestore.com. Id. Plain-
tiffs alleged that Homestore.com entered into fraudulent transactions with various
defendants so that Homestore.com could purchase revenue for itself and record it in a
manner that violated SEC accounting rules. Id.
219. Id. at 1047 (citing Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 199 n.20 (1976);
Superintendent of Ins. Of the State of N.Y. v. Bankers Life and Casualty Co., 404 U.S.
6, 10 n.7 (1971).
220. Id. at 1047-48 (quoting Howard v. Everex Sys., Inc., 228 F.3d 1057, 1061 n.5
(9th Cir. 2000)).
221. Id. at 1048.
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appearance of fact in furtherance of the scheme. It is not enough
that a transaction in which a defendant was involved had a decep-
tive purpose and effect; the defendant's own conduct contributing
to the transaction or overall scheme must have had a deceptive
purpose and effect. 2
The court rejected the defendant's contention that imposing lia-
bility on actors who failed to make a public misstatement or omission
violated the holding of Central Bank.' The court emphasized that the
focus was on the deceptive nature of the defendant's own conduct,
which ensured that only primary violators would be held liable under
section 10(b) and SEC Rule 10b-5. T
In Regents of University of California v. Credit Suisse First Boston
(USA), Inc. ,2' however, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit re-
jected the theory of scheme liability. 6 Regents involved a securities
class action in the wake of the Enron collapse.2 ' The plaintiffs claimed
that multiple defendants entered into a scheme that enabled Enron to
temporarily decrease its liabilities while simultaneously recording rev-
enues, thus allowing Enron to misstate its financial condition.m
The court stated that the manner in which the district court con-
ceived a "deceptive act" was in contravention to the Supreme Court's
holding in Central Bank.2 '9 Refusing to adopt the reasoning in Simp-
son, the court held that to be liable under section 10(b) and SEC Rule
10b-5, defendants must have engaged in conduct that was deceptive
within the meaning of the statute 30 Deceptive conduct involved either
a misstatement or an omission from one with a duty to disclose." 1
The court concluded by stating that "[s]trict construction of [section]
10(b) against inputting aiding and abetting liability for secondary ac-
tors under the rubric of 'deceptive acts' or 'schemes' gives rise to the
certainty that the Court sought in Central Bank.",12 Thus, the Fifth
Circuit rejected the theory of "scheme liability," deciding instead to
222. Simpson v. AOL Time Warner Inc., 452 F.3d 1040, 1048 (9th Cir. 2006).
223. Id. at 1049.
224. Id.
225. 482 F.3d 372 (5th Cir. 2007).
226. Id. at 385-90.
227. Id. at 376-77.
228. Id. at 377.
229. Id. at 386.
230. Id. at 389.
231. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Credit Suisse First Boston (USA), Inc., 482 F.3d.
372, 388 (5th Cir. 2007) (citing In re Charter Commc'ns, Inc., Sec. Litig. v. Scientific-
Atlanta Inc., 443 F.3d 987, 990 (8th Cir. 2006)).
232. Id. at 392.
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adopt the strict statutory approach that the Supreme Court used in
Central Bank.3 The alternative conclusions reached in Simpson and
Regents created a split in the federal circuit courts as to the legitimacy
of "scheme liability." Shortly thereafter, the United States Supreme
Court resolved the split in Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v.
Scientific-Atlanta, Inc. 5
III. THE CASE
In 2000, Charter Communications, Inc. ("Charter"), one of the
nation's largest cable service providers," engaged in a number of
fraudulent accounting practices designed to inflate the numbers pre-
sented in its quarterly financial reports for the purpose of meeting
Wall Street's expectations for subscriber growth and operating cash
flow. 7 Realizing that these efforts would nevertheless prove too little
and too late-and desperate for additional revenue and cash to meet
projections-Charter entered into transactions with both Scientific-
Atlanta, Inc. ("Scientific-Atlanta"), and Motorola, Inc. ("Motorola")
(together as "Respondents"), both then-existing suppliers of Charter's
cable television hardware. 8 The transactions constituted a scheme
that ultimately led the to criminal indictments of four Charter execu-
tives,' 39 criminal and civil proceedings against Respondents, 2 ' and pre-
233. Id. at 387.
234. Compare Simpson, 452 F.3d 1040 and Regents, 482 F.3d 372.
235. 128 S. Ct. 761 (2008).
236. http://www.charter.com/Visitors/AboutCharter.aspx?NonProductltem=20
(last visited Feb. 1, 2008).
237. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761, 766
(2008). The fraudulent practices "included misclassification of its customer base; de-
layed reporting of terminated customers; improper capitalization of costs that should
have been shown as expenses; and manipulation of the company's billing cutoff dates
to inflate reported revenues." Id.
238. Id. "Scientific-Atlanta is headquartered in Lawrenceville, Georgia and is a
leading manufacturer of products for the cable television industry." In re Charter
Commc'ns, Inc., Sec. Litig., No. MDL 1506, 2004 WL 3826761, at *3 (E.D. Mo. Oct.
12, 2004) ("In re Charter Commc'ns r'). "Motorola is based in Schaumberg, Illinois,
and is also one of the country's leading manufacturers of electronic equipment, includ-
ing products for the cable television industry." Id.
239. Indictment, United States v. Barford, No. 4:03 CR 00434 (E.D. Mo. July 24,
2003), available at http:// www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/chargingdocs/charterindictment.pdf.
The SEC also issued a cease-and-desist order against Charter. Brief for Respondents
at *7, Stoneridge Inv. Partners, v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761 (2008) (No.
06-43), 2007 WL 2363257.
240. Brief for Petitioner at *3, Stoneridge Inv. Partners, v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc.,
128 S. Ct. 761 (2008) (No. 06-43), 2007 WL 1701941. The United States Department of
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cipitated the United States Supreme Court's recent decision in Stone-
ridge Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc.,241 which is
the subject of this note. In Stonebridge, investors of Charter's common
stock sued Respondents for securities fraud under section 10(b) of the
Exchange Act, seeking to recoup losses from Respondents for their
role in entering into various transactions that enabled Charter to issue
misleading financial statements.2
This section first presents the apparent reason for the transac-
tions' implementation and explains in detail the transactions entered
into between Charter and Respondents.24 ' Next, the section discusses
the procedural history of the case and how it came to be argued at the
United States Supreme Court.2' Finally, it discusses the Supreme
Court's holding in Stoneridge, the reasoning employed by the majority
in rendering its decision, and the alternative conclusions reached in
the dissenting opinion. 5
A. Facts
This section first discusses Charter's financial condition that led
to its transactions with Respondents."f It also explains the details of
the transactions and the effect those transactions had on both Charter
and Respondent companies.2 ' 7 Finally, the section concludes with a
discussion of the holdings of both the district and appellate courts.2'
1. Charter's Financial Condition
In the late 1990s, an increase in cable network installation costs
took its toll on the cable provider market. 9 During this period, it was
not at all unusual for operating expenses to exceed revenues, thereby
cutting into profit margins." Thus, rather than value cable providers
based upon more traditional earnings measures, Wall Street analysts
Justice brought criminal proceedings against Respondents, and the Securities Ex-
change Commission brought civil proceedings against Respondents. Id.
241. 128 S. Ct. 761 (2008).
242. Id. at 766.
243. See infra Part III.A.1-2.
244. See infra Part III.A.3.
245. See infra Part III.B.
246. See infra Part III.A.1.
247. See infra Part III.A.2.
248. See infra Part III.A.3.
249. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 240, at *5.
250. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 240, at *5.
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"valued cable companies based upon whether they were achieving
significant growth in revenues, indicating increasing market share...
and cash flow." 1
In 2000, Charter had close to 295 million shares of outstanding
common stock."2 Given the volatile marketplace, Charter knew that
missing Wall Street's projections for revenue and operating cash flow
would ravage the price of Charter's stock."3 To avoid this outcome,
Charter engaged in a variety of fraudulent reporting activities to in-
flate its quarterly numbers. Despite these efforts, however, in late
2000, "Charter executives realized that ... the company would miss
projected operating cash flow numbers by $15 to $20 million.""25 In an
attempt to avoid the inevitable, Charter made a proposal to Respon-
dents that they alter their existing arrangements. 6
2. The Scheme
As a cable provider, Charter "provide[d] video, data, interactive
and private business network services to millions of customers across
the country through its broadband network of coaxial and fiber-optic
cables." 27 Respondents manufactured and supplied set-top boxes to
Charter for its use in providing cable services to its customers."8 Feel-
ing the pressure to meet Wall Street's expectations, Charter and Res-
pondents entered into an arrangement by which Charter agreed to pay
Respondents twenty dollars above the market price of each set-top
box until the end of the year. 9 In return, Respondents agreed to pur-
chase advertising from Charter with the additional funds gained from
the sale of set-top boxes.2" In violation of generally accepted account-
251. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 240, at *5.
252. Brief for Respondents, supra note 239, at *8.
253. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 240, at *5.
254. Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 766; see supra note 237.
255. Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 766.
256. Id.
257. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 240, at *4.
258. Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 766. A "set-top box" is "a unit that is typically placed
on top of a television set to enable the customer to access digital cable television and
other digital services." In re Charter Commc'ns, Inc., Sec. Litig. v. Charter Commc'ns,
Inc., No. MDL 1506, 2004 WL 3826761, at *3 (E.D.Mo. Oct. 12, 2004).
259. Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 766.
260. Id. Respondents had never previously purchased advertising from Charter.
Brief for Petitioner, supra note 240, at *6. However, Respondents now agreed to pay
rates four to five times more than they typically paid for advertising in the market-
place. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 240, at *8. Furthermore, "[t]he amounts Res-
pondents agreed to pay for the advertising were exactly equal to the overpayments
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ing principles, Charter capitalized the cost of purchasing the set top
boxes-enabling Charter to spread the cost of the set-top boxes over a
number of years-and immediately recorded the sale of advertising to
Respondents as revenue in its current quarter. 261 The fraudulent re-
porting of the transaction allowed Charter to meet its quarterly pro-
jections.
Knowing that Charter's auditor, Arthur Andersen, would not sign
off on the transactions as legitimate without altering the timeline of
263events, the parties drafted documents giving the false appearance
that the contracts for purchase of set-top boxes and the contracts for
sale of advertising were separate and distinct-therefore, legitimate-
transactions, negotiated at fair value at two distinct periods of time.
261
Charter subsequently recorded the sale of advertising as revenue in its
current quarter-increasing quarterly revenue by $17 million-and
submitted to the SEC the inflated quarterly financial reports.2' Res-
pondents properly reported the transactions as a wash under generally
that Charter made to Respondents: Motorola would pay $10,800,000 and Scientific-
Atlanta $6,730,000." Brief for Petitioner, supra note 240, at *8. Charter was "an im-
portant customer of Scientific-Atlanta and Motorola, the two largest manufacturers of
such converter boxes and other equipment used by cable companies," thus making it
difficult for Respondents to turn down the proposed transactions. In re Charter
Commc'ns 1, 2004 WL 3826761, at *3.
261. Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 766. "Charter announced its operating results and
projections on a quarterly basis in press releases and during conference calls with
analysts." Brief for Petitioner, supra note 240, at *5.
262. Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 767.
263. Brief for Respondents, supra note 239, at *6. "Anderson allegedly advised
Charter that it should not recognize the [Respondents'] payments as advertising reve-
nue because 'they appeared integrally related to the cost increases being paid by
Charter."' Brief for Respondents, supra note 239, at *6. Charter's auditor stated that it
would approve the transactions "only if the set-top box payments and advertising fees
were at fair market value, unrelated, and negotiated at least a month apart." Brief for
Respondents, supra note 239, at *6.
264. Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 767. Scientific-Atlanta sent Charter a "pricing in-
crease notification letter" falsely stating the reason for the increase in cost. Brief for
Petitioner, supra note 240, at *6-7. Additionally, Charter sent Motorola a contract
that enabled Motorola to collect liquidated damages of twenty dollars for each set-top
box Charter failed to purchase with the expectation that Charter would fail to pur-
chase enough set-top boxes to cover Motorola's cost of purchasing advertising from
Charter. Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 767. To give the appearance that the contracts for
set-top boxes and the contracts for sale of advertising were not related, Respondents
backdated the contracts for set-top boxes to August 2000. Brief for Petitioner, supra
note 240, at *8-9.
265. Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 767.
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accepted accounting principles and took "no role in preparing or dis-
seminating Charter's financial statements. '' 6
Subsequent to the formation of the scheme, the pubic became
aware of the economic reality of the transactions, thereby forcing
Charter to restate its financial reports for the preceding periods in
accordance with generally accepted accounting principles.2 67 Due to
this restatement, the market value of Charter's common stock de-
creased drastically. Additionally, the United States indicted four
Charter executives,2" the SEC brought a cease-and-desist order
against Charter,"7 the Department of Justice brought criminal charges
against Respondents,271 and the SEC instituted both civil proceedings
and a cease-and-desist order against Motorola and two executives at
Scientific-Atlanta. 3
3. Procedural History
Reeling from the devastating financial effects caused by the dras-
tic decrease in Charter's stock price in the aftermath of the criminal
and civil indictments of both Charter and Respondents, Stonebridge
Investment Partners, ("Petitioner")-representing investors holding
Charter's securities from November 8, 1999, through July 17, 2002,
(the class period)-filed a putative securities class action under section
10(b) of Exchange Act and SEC Rule 10b-5(b) against Charter, Res-
266. Id.
267. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 240, at *9. This restatement was not only the
result of Charter's transactions with Respondents but for all fraudulent activities en-
gaged in by Charter in previous periods. Brief for Respondents, supra note 239, at *7-
8.
268. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 240, at *9. "A restatement by Charter of its
financial reports issued in April 2003 indicated that Charter's operating cash flow had
been inflated by $292 million in 2001 and $195 million in 2000, for a total of $487 mil-
lion." Brief for Respondents, supra note 239, at *7. This drove down the price of
Charter's common stock from a class period high of $26.31 per share to a mere $0.76
by October 2002. Brief for Respondents, supra note 239, at *7-8. Respondents noted
that the increase in revenue attributable to the transactions entered into with both
Respondents "inflated Charter's cash flow for a single quarter by $17 million, i.e., only
3.5% of the total inflation alleged." Brief for Respondents, supra note 239, at *8.
269. Indictment, United States v. Barford, No. 4:03 CR 00434 (E.D. Mo. July 24,
2003) available at http:// www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/chargingdocs/charterindictment.pdf.
270. In the Matter of Charter Commc'ns, Inc. Respondent., S.E.C. Release No. 34-
50,098, 2004 WL 1687930 (July 27,2004).
271. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 240, at *3.
272. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 240, at *3.
273. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 240, at *11.
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pondents, and current and former executives of Arthur Anderson.274
Petitioner sought to impose liability on Respondents for alleged losses
suffered from the decrease in value of Charter's common stock.27
This section turns to the procedural history of the case. It first dis-
cusses the district court's finding in favor of Respondents.276 Next, this
section examines the Eighth Circuit's holding in favor of Petitioner, as
well as the reasoning behind the court's ruling.
a. The district court's decision
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Mis-
souri granted Respondents' motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim on which relief could be granted.2 78 The court concluded that, at
most, Petitioner's claims against Respondents constituted claims of
aiding and abetting, which are precluded by the Supreme Court's
holding in Central Bank.2 79 According to the court, "[t]he critical ele-
ment separating primary from aiding and abetting violations is the
existence of a representation, either by statement or by omission,
made by the defendant, that is relied upon by the plaintiff."
The court reasoned that Petitioner's complaint failed to assert
that Respondents participated in the creation of Charter's financial
statements or that Respondents were even aware of the manner in
which Charter accounted for the transactions.28 Additionally, the
court found that Petitioner's complaint failed to allege that Respon-
dents made any public representations concerning the transactions or
that investors relied upon any statements made by Respondents. 2
274. In re Charter Commc'ns I, 2004 WL 3826761, at *1-2. Defendants other than
Respondents and Arthur Anderson settled the claims for $146.5 million prior to the
district court's ruling. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 240, at *4. The district court
denied Arthur Anderson's motion to dismiss. In re Charter Commc'ns 1, 2004 WL
3826761, at *1.
275. Stoneridge Inv. Partners. v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761, 766 (2008).
276. See infra Part III.A.3.a.
277. See infra Part III.A.3.b.
278. In re Charter Commc'ns 1, 2004 WL 3826761, at *1.
279. Id. at *5.
280. Id. (quoting Anixter v. Home-Stake Prod. Co., 77 F.3d 1215, 1225 (10th Cir.
1996)).
281. Id.
282. Id. The court also denied Petitioner's motion to amend the complaint. In re
Charter Commc'ns, Inc., Sec. Litig., No. MDL 1506, 2004 WL 3826760 at *6 (E.D. Mo.
Dec. 20, 2004), affd, 443 F.3d 987 (8th Cir. 2006), cert. granted sub nom. Stoneridge




Consequently, the court granted Respondents' motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim.'l Petitioner then appealed the ruling to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.'
b. Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit af-
firmed the district court's ruling, holding that the district court proper-
ly ruled that Petitioner's claims against Respondents amounted to
claims of aiding and abetting, which are barred by Central Bank.' The
court reiterated the district court's reasoning that Petitioners failed to
claim that Respondents directly engaged in any deceptive act on which
Petitioner relied.26 The court stated that
any defendant who does not make or affirmatively cause to be
made a fraudulent misstatement or omission, or who does not di-
rectly engage in manipulative securities trading practices, is at most
guilty of aiding and abetting and cannot be held liable under [Ex-
change Act] [section] 10(b) or any subpart of [SEC] Rule 10b-5.2
Petitioner appealed the Eighth Circuit's holding, and the Su-
preme Court of the United States granted Petitioner's petition for writ
of certiorari.m
B. Reasoning
In Stoneridge, the Supreme Court, in a five to three decision, af-
firmed the Eighth Circuit's holding that the transactions entered into
with Charter did not expose Respondents to civil liability for losses
claimed by investors holding Charter's common stock.289 The majority
first concluded that "[t]he [section] 10(b) implied private right of ac-
tion [did] not extend to aiders and abettors. '' 290 Next, the majority held
283. In re Charter Commc'ns 1, 2004 WL 3826761, at *18.
284. See In re Charter Commc'ns, Inc., Sec. Litig. v. Charter Commc'ns, Inc., 443
F.3d 987 (8th Cir. 2006), cert. granted sub nom. Stoneridge Inv. Partners v. Scientific-
Atlantic, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1873 (2007) (No. 06-43), affd, 128 S. Ct. 761 (2008).
285. Id. at 992. The court also affirmed the district court's denial of Petitioner's
motion to amend the complaint. Id.
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Stoneridge Inv. Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1873 (2007) (No.
06-43), aftd, 128 S. Ct. 761 (2008).
289. Stoneridge Inv. Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761, 766 (2008).
290. Id. at 769.
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that Petitioner did not rely on Respondents' actions, which precluded
a theory of primary liability under section 10(b) of the Exchange
Act.29 Finally, the majority rejected Petitioner's theory of "scheme
liability," again holding that Respondents' actions did not invoke Peti-
tioner's requisite reliance on those transactions in its decision to pur-
chase Charter's securities.292
1. Majority Opinion
The majority commenced its analysis of the issues with an exami-
nation of private rights of action for violations of section 10(b) of the
Exchange Act.29 Examining the text of both section 10(b) of the Ex-
change Act and SEC Rule 10b-5, the Court stated that although "the
text of the Securities Exchange Act does not provide for a private
cause of action for [section] 10(b) violations, the Court has found a
right of action implied in the words of the statute and its implementing
regulation."'294 The majority asserted, however, that its holding in Cen-
tral Bank specifically barred a private right of action against those who
merely aid and abet primary violators of the securities law. 25
Subsequent to the holding in Central Bank, industry leaders
pushed Congress to include an express cause of action for aiding and
abetting in the Exchange Act.26 The majority underscored the fact
that Congress failed to take the proposed action.29 Instead, Congress
assigned prosecutorial duties solely to the SEC.29' Implying from this
congressional intent, the majority again reaffirmed the fact that "[t]he
[section] 10(b) implied private right of action [did] not extend to ai-
ders and abettors. '299 To establish an implied right of action under sec-
tion 10(b) and SEC Rule 10b-5, a plaintiff must establish that the sec-
ondary actor's conduct meets each and every element or precondition
for liability."°
291. Id.
292. Id. at 770-74.
293. Id. at 768.
294. Id. "The Court [in Central Bank] found the scope of [section] 10(b) to be
delimited by the text, which makes no mention of aiding and abetting liability." Id.
(citing Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 177
(1994)).
295. Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 768.
296. Id. at 768-69.






After establishing that an implied private right of action under
section 10(b) failed to reach Respondents as aiders and abettors, the
majority's analysis turned to whether Respondents, as secondary ac-
tors, were primarily liable under the Exchange Act.3"' Although sever-
al elements are necessary for a plaintiff to bring a successful section
10(b) private action claim,"° the majority limited its analysis to the
only element at issue in this case: Petitioner's reliance upon Respon-
dents' misrepresentation or omission."'
In analyzing the issue of reliance, the majority first asserted that it
is unnecessary for a plaintiff to provide specific proof of reliance in
two instances: (1) "if there is an omission of a material fact by one
with a duty to disclose" and (2) "under the fraud-on-the-market doc-
trine, reliance is presumed when the statements at issue become pub-
lic.""3 4 If either of these two circumstances exists, a rebuttable pre-
sumption of reliance arises.0 The majority concluded that neither cir-
cumstance applied to the specific facts alleged by Petitioner in the
case.3 6 The majority reasoned that, "Respondents had no duty to dis-
close; and their deceptive acts were not communicated to the public.
No member of the investing public had knowledge, either actual or
presumed, of [R]espondents' deceptive acts during the relevant
times. ' Based on these facts, the majority concluded that Petitioner
failed to assert proof of the requisite reliance to successfully claim an
implied private right of action under section 10(b) of the Exchange
Act. °8
301. Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 769.
302. Id. at 768. "In a typical section 10(b) private action a plaintiff must prove (1) a
material misrepresentation or omission by the defendant; (2) scienter; (3) a connec-
tion between the misrepresentation or omission and the purchase or sale of a security;
(4) reliance upon the misrepresentation or omission; (5) economic loss; and (6) loss
causation." Id.
303. Id. at 769. The majority stated that the reliance element "ensures that, for
liability to arise, the 'requisite causal connection between a defendant's misrepresen-
tation and a plaintiff's injury' exists as a predicate for liability." Id. (quoting Basic Inc.
v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224,243 (1988)).
304. Id.
305. Id. As to the fraud-on-the-market doctrine, reliance is presumed because
"[tihe public information is reflected in the market price of the security. Then it can
be assumed that an investor who buys or sells stock at the market price relies upon the
statement." Id.
306. Id.
307. Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 769. Charter's financial statements did not disclose
the transactions entered into with Respondents. Brief for Respondents, supra note
239, at *1.
308. Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 770.
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Despite the absence of either a duty to disclose or a public state-
ment made by Respondents, Petitioner nonetheless sought to impose
liability upon Respondents by circumventing the reliance requirement
under a theory known as "scheme liability."'9 The crux of Petitioner's
argument was that "the financial statement Charter released to the
public was a natural and expected consequence of [R]espondents' de-
ceptive acts."31 Petitioner asserted that absent Respondents' mislead-
ing acts, Charter's financial statement would have more accurately
reflected the economic reality of Charter's financial health.31 Petition-
er argued that this causal link should be sufficient to raise a rebuttable
presumption of Petitioner's reliance.3"2 In effect, Petitioner argued that
by relying on the express statements contained in financial reports
relating to securities, investors necessarily rely on the transactions un-
derlying the financial numbers stated therein."'
The majority rejected Petitioner's argument of "scheme liability,"
warning that if the Court adopted this concept of reliance, "the im-
plied cause of action would reach the whole marketplace in which the
issuing company does business; and there is no authority for this
rule. 31 4 Underscoring the fact that the reliance element's purpose is
linked to causation, the majority stated that the appropriate inquiry
was whether "[R]espondents' acts were immediate or remote to the
injury." '315 Because it was Charter and not Respondents, who deceived
Charter's auditor into signing off on the inflated financial statements,
the majority concluded that Respondents' acts were too remote to
justify a finding that Petitioner relied on Respondents' private actions,
reasoning that "nothing [R]espondents did made it necessary or in-
evitable for Charter to record the transactions as it did.,
316
Additionally, the Court rejected "scheme liability" based on con-
cepts of federalism."7 The majority urged that Petitioner was attempt-
ing to invoke a private cause of action for securities fraud-the realm
of financing business-and apply it to the realm of ordinary business
operations. 8 According to the Court, state law primarily governs the
309. Id. at 769-70; see infra Part II.E.3.
310. Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 770.
311. Id.
312. Id.
313. Id. at 770.
314. Id.
315. Id.
316. Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 770.
317. Id. at 770-71.
318. Id. at 770.
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latter."9 Thus, the majority stated that an extension of the private
cause of action for securities fraud would risk that "federal power
would be used to invite litigation beyond the immediate sphere of se-
curities litigation and in areas already governed by functioning and
effective state-law guarantees.""32  According to the majority,
precedent warned against such extensions.2 '
The majority's analysis on Petitioner's theory of "scheme liabili-
322ty" next proceeded to an examination of congressional intent . In
response to the Court's holding in Central Bank, Congress-despite
industry pressure to include in the Exchange Act an express cause of
action for aiding and abetting3 -limited prosecutorial duties solely to
the SEC.3 Asserting that Petitioner's theory of primary liability
"ma[de] any aider or abettor liable under [section] 10(b) if he or she
committed a deceptive act in the process of providing assistance," the
majority concluded that Petitioner's theory "would revive in substance
the implied cause of action against all aiders and abettors except those
who committed no deceptive act in the process of facilitating the
fraud; and we would undermine Congress'[s] determination that this
class of defendants should be pursued by the SEC and not by private
litigants. ''32 Thus, the majority concluded that Congress's decision not
to include an express cause of action for aiding and abetting in the
Exchange Act supported the majority's decision to reject the expan-
sion of private rights of action under section 10(b) to aiders and abet-
tors under Petitioner's theory of "scheme liability.""
Continuing its argument, the majority proceeded to discuss the
consequences of implementing an expansion of private rights of action
to aiders and abettors under a theory of "scheme liability., 327 The ma-
319. Id.
320. Id. at 770-71. The majority stated that although a private cause of action un-
der section 10(b) of the Exchange Act applies to areas of the law other than the secur-
ities markets, "it does not reach all commercial transactions that are fraudulent and
affect the price of a security in some attenuated way." Id. at 771.
321. Id. at 771 (citing Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 556 (1982)). Invoking
similar reasoning, the majority quickly tackled Petitioner's assertion that if the present
action were a common law action for fraud, the Petitioner could show reliance. Id.
The majority stated that "[s]ection 10(b) does not incorporate common-law fraud into
federal law." Id.
322. Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 771-72.
323. Id. at 768-69.
324. Id. at 771 (citing Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, sec. 104,
Pub. L. No. 10467, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78t(e) (2001))).
325. Id. at 771.
326. Id. at 771-72.
327. Id. at 772.
[Vol. 31
SECURITIES LAW
jority stated that an expansion could increase litigation by allowing
plaintiffs to assert weak claims in an attempt to extort settlements
from innocent defendants." Consequently, the increase in litigation
would necessarily increase the cost of doing business as the risk of lia-
bility would force companies to defend frivolous claims.3" Additional-
ly, an expansion of liability may deter overseas firms from doing busi-
ness in America.""33 The Court warned that these consequences could
lead to rising industry prices, making it less profitable to invest in
American markets.331
Next, the majority examined the history of the section 10(b) pri-
vate right of action and the judicial approach of expanding the private
right of action beyond the parameters set out by Congress.332 Stating
the rule that an implied cause of action only exists if a court can infer
from the text of the statute congressional intent to create an implied
right, the majority-reiterating its argument that Congress's action in
not expanding the private right of action when pressed to do so prec-
luded an argument that Congress intended the right to be expanded-
concluded that if the implied private right of action under section
10(b) should be expanded, it should be expanded by Congress only
and not by the judiciary.3
The majority concluded its opinion with a reminder that the en-
forcement powers against aiders and abettors of primary section 10(b)
violators "is not toothless"-secondary actors are nevertheless subject
to both criminal charges and civil penalties, which are enforced by the
appropriate governmental agency. 34 The majority also asserted that
the standards for liability of some secondary actors-accountants,
lawyers, underwriters, etc.-are expressly set out in the Exchange
Act.335 Additionally, the majority stated that secondary actors may still
be liable if they commit primary violations.
328. Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 772.
329. Id.
330. Id.
331. Id. at 772.
332. Id. at 772-73.
333. Id.
334. Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 773. The majority stated that "[s]ince September 30,
2002, SEC enforcement actions have collected over $10 billion in disgorgement and
penalties, much of it for distribution to injured investors." Id.
335. Id.




Justice Stevens authored the dissenting opinion, which Justices
Souter and Ginsberg joined.337 The dissent argued that the majority's
holding was faulty on two premises: "(1) the Court's overly broad
reading of Central Bank, and (2) the view that reliance requires a kind
of super-causation."3"
The dissenting opinion first distinguished the case at hand with
that of Central Bank.3 Justice Stevens argued that by backdating and
executing documents that provided false reasons for the increase in
cost, Respondents' actions clearly met the language of section 10(b)
because Respondents' actions "plainly describe[d] 'deceptive devices'
under any standard reading of the phrase."' Justice Stevens stated,
however, that in Central Bank the defendant never engaged in any act
arising to the level of a primary violation of section 10(b)."' Thus, ac-
cording to the dissent, "Central Bank . . . pose[d] no obstacle to
[P]etitioner's argument that it has alleged a cause of action under [sec-
tion] 10(b)."' 2
Next, the dissent argued that the majority's conclusion that Peti-
tioner failed to demonstrate reliance was erroneous and unnecessary
given that the Eighth Circuit did not base its conclusion on reliance
grounds."3 Relying on the Court's decision in Basic, Inc. v. Levinson,'"
which created the "fraud-on-the-market presumption" of reliance,3 45
the dissent argued that the majority's view of reliance was "unduly
stringent and unmoored from authority."' The dissent argued that
instead of first examining the "fraud-on-the-market presumption," the
majority should have first examined the causation required."7 Justice
Stevens argued that the majority's perception of causation was faul-
337. Id. at 774. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
338. Id.
339. Id. at 775.
340. Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 775 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
341. Id.
342. Id.
343. Id. at 775-76.
344. 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
345. Id. at 250.
346. Stoneridge Inv. Partners v. Scientific Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761, 776-77
(2008) (Stevens, J. dissenting).
347. Id. at 776. The dissent conceded that "the Court is right that a fraud-on-the-
market presumption coupled with its view on causation would not support petitioner's
view of reliance." Id.
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ty. 8 Asserting that the "causation necessary to demonstrate reliance
[was] not a difficult hurdle to clear," the dissent argued that by first
looking to causation before proceeding to the "fraud-on-the-market
presumption" of reliance, the Petitioner's burden of pleading reliance
clearly was met.349
Next, the dissent rebutted the majority's argument that extending
the private cause of action to aiders and abettors of primary violators
of section 10(b) would wreak havoc on the marketplace. 5 The dissent
disposed of the majority's argument by illustrating that only aiders and
abettors who were themselves violators of section 10(b) would be lia-
ble under the Exchange Act.351 The dissent stated that, contrary to the
majority's view, "[h]olding liable wrongdoers who actively engage in
fraudulent conduct that lacks a legitimate business purpose does not
hinder, but rather enhances, the integrity of our markets and our
economy." '352
As to the majority's argument that Congress did not intend for
the extension of private causes of action for section 10(b) violations,
Justice Stevens focused on Congress's compromise in not undoing the
decision in Central Bank.353 Thus, the dissent argued that by expressly
recognizing the need for enforcement in this area-that is, by delegat-
ing prosecutorial duties of enforcement of aiding and abetting liability
to the SEC-Congress surely did not mean "to immunize an unde-
fined class of actual violators of [section] 10(b) from liability in private
litigation. 354 The dissent stated that even Congress recognized that
private litigation under the Exchange Act continues to serve a pivotal
role in ensuring the integrity of security markets.5
The dissent concluded its opinion with the history and importance
of the implied cause of action under section 10(b) of the Exchange
Act.356 Justice Stevens explained that the majority's hostility towards
private rights of action was mistaken, stating that "[a] basic principle
348. Id. The dissent asserted that the causation requirement was similar to "but-
for" causation. Id. And the dissent concluded that "[R]espondents' acts had the fore-
seeable effect of causing petitioner to engage in the relevant securities transactions."
Id. at 777.
349. Id. at 776-77.
350. Id.
351. Id. The dissent also rebutted the majority's argument that common law no-
tions of reliance were not applicable under section 10(b). Id.
352. Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 779 n.10 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
353. Id. at 778.
354. Id.
355. Id..
356. Id. at 779.
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animating our jurisprudence was enshrined in state constitution provi-
sions guaranteeing, in substance, that 'every wrong shall have a reme-
dy.' ' 357 Justice Stevens concluded by stating, "Congress enacted [sec-
tion] 10(b) with the understanding that federal courts respected the
principle that every wrong would have a remedy." '358 The dissent urged
that the majority's holding merely cuts back on Congress's intended
remedy. 9
IV. SIGNIFICANCE
Many consider the holding in Stoneridge to be the most signifi-
cant securities case decided in the last few decades. One legal pro-
fessor went so far as to describe the case as "the business community's
equivalent of Roe v. Wade." 1 The bulk of Stoneridge's importance lies
in the holding's implications on both individual investors and the
United States securities markets3 62 as well as on accountants, under-
writers, and other secondary actors in the securities markets. 63 Al-
though it is presently unclear whether the holding in Stoneridge is a
victory or a defeat for either individual investors or the United States
securities markets as a whole, it represents a significant victory for
secondary actors by severely limiting the circumstances in which
courts may hold secondary actors liable under section 10(b). 6 Due to
the tendencies of federal courts to temper the harshness of Supreme
Court decisions,365 however, it is likely that plaintiffs will successfully
develop fresh, novel theories designed to circumvent the elements
necessary to establish an implied private right of action under section
10(b) and SEC Rule 10b-5 as to secondary actors.' Consequently, it
357. Id. at 779 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
358. Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 782 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
359. Id.
360. John Engler, Say No to Trial Lawyers, USA TODAY, Oct. 8, 2007, at 12A.
361. Carrie Johnson & Robert Barnes, High Court's Fraud Case Widely Seen as
Stand-In for Enron, THE WASHINGTON POST, Oct. 5, 2007, at D01; see Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973) (holding that Texas abortion statutes prohibiting a mother to
have an abortion at any stage in the pregnancy except to save the mother's life are
unconstitutional).
362. See infra Part IV.A.
363. See infra Part IV.B. In part, the holding is also significant because it resolved
the split in the federal circuit courts regarding the legitimacy of the theory of "scheme
liability." See supra Part II.E.3.
364. Michael L. Rugen, Stoneridge and Enron-Are Secondary Actors Free from
Liability for Securities Fraud?, 13 No. 20 ANDREWS SEC. LITIG. & REG. REP. 3 (2008).
365. Luton, supra note 8, at 46-47 (1994).
366. See infra Part IV.C.
[Vol. 31
SECURITIES LAW
is unlikely that Stoneridge will put an end to private securities litiga-
tion as many commentators predict. 37
A. Individual Investors and the United States Securities Markets
Much of the debate surrounding Stoneridge centers on the effects
that the holding will have on both individual investors and the United
States securities markets as a whole.3" This section first outlines the
competing arguments as to whether Stoneridge represents a victory or
a defeat for individual investors. 69 Next, this section concludes by dis-
cussing alternative views as to whether the holding in Stoneridge will
positively or negatively affect the United States' securities markets. °
1. Investors
The holding in Stoneridge is significant to individual investors in-
jured by securities fraud who are now barred from bringing suits
against non-speaking secondary actors."' Whether Stoneridge will po-
sitively or negatively impact individual investors as a whole is an issue
of debate.7 On one side of the coin, the plaintiff's bar sees the holding
in Stoneridge as a major setback to investors.373 It argues that investors
are left with inadequate remedies and avenues for recouping losses
incurred as a result of securities fraud . 4 The significance of this set-
back is most immediately evident in the wake of Enron's collapse. Al-
though plaintiffs have recovered more than seven billion dollars from
the investment banks that gave assistance to Enron in misleading its
investors, another forty billion dollars of losses remain unclaimed.3 75
The holding in Stoneridge makes it likely that the forty billion dollars
of outstanding losses will remain unclaimed, leaving many investors
without remedy.376 As the dissent in Stoneridge stated, however, it is a
367. C. Neal Gray, Stoneridge Limits Private Securities Fraud Claims Against Sec-
ondary Actors, 13 No. 20 ANDREWS SEC. LITIG. & REG. REP. 4 (2008).
368. See infra Part IV.A.1-2.
369. See infra Part IV.A.1.
370. See infra Part IV.A.2.
371. See supra Part III.B.
372. See infra notes 370-79.
373. Richard L. Baum, The Stoneridge Decision: The Death Knell for "Scheme
Liability", 2008 ASPATORE INSTANT AWARENESS 5 (2008).
374. Id.
375. Daniel Tyukody & Michael Hefter, 'Stoneridge' Alters Legal Landscape, 30
NAT'LL.J. S1 (2008), available at 3/17/2008 Nat'l L.J. S, (Col. 1).
376. Id.; Rugen, supra note 364. Subsequent to the holding in Stoneridge, in a case
stemming from Enron's collapse, the Supreme Court denied plaintiff's certiorari peti-
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staple of American jurisprudence that "every wrong shall have a re-
medy., 377 Thus, many investors will likely look down upon Stoneridge
with contempt, disenchanted by a regulatory system that leaves inves-
tors vulnerable.
On the flip side of the coin, other commentators hail the Stone-
ridge holding as a clear victory for individual investors as a whole.378
These commentators emphasize the fact that investors as a group do
not benefit from frivolous lawsuits against companies that fail to make
or have no duty to make representations to investors.379 When compa-
nies pay out capital in the form of settlements or compensation, in one
form or another the money comes from the investors themselves.38
One commentator stated that "[w]hen a company pays a large (suppo-
sedly pro-investor) judgment, that money comes out of the hide of
existing shareholders." '' Consequently, these commentators argue
that Stoneridge represents a clear victory for investors as a whole, in
that an expansion of private securities litigation more commonly in-
creases, rather than decreases, the economic burden on individual in-
382vestors.
2. The United States Securities Markets
There is a growing consensus among experts that the supremacy
of the United States securities markets is declining.3 3 Consequently, it
is of no surprise that a large number of parties, concerned over the
impact that Stoneridge might have on the well-being of the United
States securities markets, filed an unprecedented number of amicus
briefs on both sides of the issue.3" On one side of the argument, com-
tion, in which the plaintiffs asserted secondary liability claims against several invest-
ment bankers. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1120 (2008) (No. 06-1341); see Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Credit
Suisse First Boston (USA), Inc., 482 F.3d 372 (5th Cir. 2007).
377. Stoneridge Inv. Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761, 779 (2008)
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
378. See Engler, supra note 360, at 12A.
379. High Court Rejects 'Scheme Liability' Under Antifraud Provisions of 1934 Act,
SEC. REG. & LAW, Vol. 40, No. 3, (Jan. 21,2008).
380. Engler, supra note 360, at 12A.
381. Engler, supra note 360, at 12A.
382. See Engler, supra note 360, at 12A.
383. C. Evan Stewart, The False Promise of 'Reform', 239 N.Y. L.J. 23 (2008),
available at 2/21/2008 N.Y. L.J. 23 (Col. 1).
384. Robert Yates, Big Deals// Verdicts// Settlements, 31 CHi. LAWYER 3, Mar. 08,
2008, at 14, available at 3/08/2008 CHIL 14. In total, there were fifteen amicus briefs
filed on each side in the case. Id. "About [twenty] former SEC commissioners and
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mentators praise Stoneridge as a triumph for the United States securi-
ties markets.3 These commentators urge that Stoneridge greatly bene-
fits the marketplace by decreasing overall litigation costs.386 According
to the Washington Legal Foundation, from 1997 to 2004, the dollar
value of securities class-action claims increased from $150 million to
over $9.6 billion.3 ' Thus, these commentators assert that the holding in
Stoneridge was a crucial victory for the United States securities mar-
kets at a time when foreign investors are beginning to move their in-
vestments out of the United States and into other foreign markets.M
As one commentator asserted, "the wrong ruling would have un-
leashed a tsunami of damaging side effects, infecting the entire [Unit-
ed States] economy.
389
On the other side of the argument, some commentators believe
that Stoneridge insulates many culprits from the consequences of their
actions.3' Although the SEC retains enforcement power under section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 against aiders and abettors, the Supreme Court
has repeatedly emphasized that "implied private actions provide 'a
most effective weapon in the enforcement' of the securities law and
are a 'necessary supplement to Commission action.' ' 39' Given that the
holding in Stoneridge makes it clear that the SEC now operates as the
sole regulatory mechanism for aiding and abetting liability under sec-
enforcement officials took different positions on the case, and the current SEC was
divided three-to-two on the proper resolution of the matter." Id.
385. See Johnson & Barnes, supra note 361, at D01; Yates, supra note 384, at 14.
386. Stewart, supra note 383 (asserting that the two main culprits to the decline in
the primacy of the United States securities markets are the increasing costs in regula-
tory compliance and liability risks associated with doing business in the United
States).
387. Johnson & Barnes, supra note 361, at D01.
388. Stewart, supra note 383.
389. High Court Rejects 'Scheme Liability' Under Antifraud Provisions of 1934 Act,
supra note 379. This is particularly true in light of the recent surge of mortgage de-
faults and foreclosures stemming from the collapse of the sub-prime mortgage indus-
try. Arthur N. Lambert & Marc R. Lepelstat, Claims from Sale of Collateral Mortgage
Obligations, 239 N.Y. L.J. 4 (2008), available at 2/15/2008 N.Y. L.J. 4 (Col. 4). Losses
resulting from mortgage-backed securities are likely to lead to a wave of litigation
against investment banks and other secondary entities under section 10(b) and SEC
Rule 10b-5. Id. Had the Supreme Court gone the other way in Stoneridge, the sub-
prime mortgage meltdown would have added to the increase in litigation costs already
infecting the United States securities markets. See id.
390. High Court Rejects 'Scheme Liability' Under Antifraud Provisions of 1934 Act,
supra note 379.
391. Stoneridge Inv. Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct.761, 779 n.10
(2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Bern-
er, 472 U.S. 229 (1985)).
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tion 10(b) and SEC Rule 10b-5, one retired SEC attorney commented
that the SEC lacks the funding "to be in a position to take up the
slack."' 92 Thus, many argue that the holding in Stoneridge leaves a gap
in the regulatory framework that decreases the integrity of the United
States securities markets.3 93 In turn, this lack of integrity makes the
United States securities markets less desirable in the eyes of foreign
investors.39 As the dissent in Stoneridge stated, "investor faith in the
safety and integrity of our markets is their strength. The fact that our
markets are the safest in the world has helped make them the strong-
est in the world.,
395
B. Secondary Actors
Although it is currently too early to tell whether the outcome of
Stoneridge will have a positive or negative effect on either individual
investors or the United States securities markets as a whole, it is un-
questionable that Stoneridge represents a major victory to accoun-
tants, underwriters, and other secondary actors in the securities mar-
kets 96 The Supreme Court's holding in Stoneridge sharply limits the
scope of relief available under section 10(b) and SEC Rule 10b-5 to
defrauded shareholders.39 The plaintiff's bar initially downplayed the
significance of the Stoneridge, arguing that the holding could be nar-
rowly confined to apply only to secondary actors who played no role
in the "investment sphere."3 98 A few days subsequent to its holding in
Stoneridge, however, the Supreme Court denied certiorari to a class
action against investment banks relating to the downfall of Enron 99
Additionally, on the same day that the Court denied certiorari in the
Enron case, it simultaneously granted certiorari in Avis Budget Group,
Inc. v. California State Teacher's Retirement System,4" vacated the
392. Johnson & Barnes, supra note 361, at D01. "The commission [cannot] be
everyplace at once." Johnson & Barnes, supra note 361, at D01.
393. Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 779 n.10 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
394. Id.
395. Id. at 779.
396. Rugen, supra note 364.
397. Id.
398. Id.
399. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,
482 F.3d 372 (5th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1120 (2008) (No. 06-1341). Unlike
the Respondents in Stoneridge, the investment banks were clearly in the "investment
sphere," "frequently structuring bogus deals to distort its financial statements while
selling billions of dollars of its securities to investors and issuing analyst reports re-
commending its stock." Rugen, supra note 364.
400. 128 S. Ct. 1119 (2008) (No. 06-560).
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judgment of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals that had accepted
"scheme liability," and remanded for further consideration in light of
the holding in Stoneridgef 1
Many commentators believe that the denial of certiorari in the
Enron case, coupled with the ruling in Avis, sent a strong message to
lower federal courts that secondary actors are not liable under section
10(b) or SEC Rule 10b-5 absent some sort of public misstatement or
omission-regardless of whether the defendants acted within the "in-
vestment sphere."' 2 This is very beneficial to secondary actors that
transact with issuing companies.4 3 First, due to the fact that Stoneridge
makes it more difficult for plaintiffs to assert liability under section
10(b) and SEC Rule lOb-5, secondary actors in the securities markets
will spend less money defending frivolous lawsuits. ' Consequently,
secondary actors will not only pay out less money in the form of com-
pensation or settlement agreements, but may also save additional capi-
tal by paying less insurance premiums from carriers who would other-
wise be forced to foot the bill.05
Additionally, had the Court in Stoneridge accepted "scheme lia-
bility," any secondary actor supplying goods or services to a public
company could be vulnerable to liability if the issuing company miss-
tated its financial earnings and mislead its investors. ' This would un-
doubtedly increase the cost of doing business for secondary actors, as
they would be forced to conduct arduous due diligence investigations
into public companies before entering into routine business transac-
tions.4 7 Finally, for the reasons stated, the acceptance of "scheme lia-
bility" would have decreased the availability of and increased the cost
of professional services.'
It should be noted, however, that although the holding in Stone-
ridge represents a clear victory for secondary actors, the public should
401. Id.; See Simpson v. AOL Time Warner, Inc., 452 F.3d 1040 (9th Cir. 2006),
cert. granted and judgment vacated sub nom. AVCS Budget Group, Inc. v. Cal. State
Teachers' Ret. Sys., 128 S. Ct. 1119 (2008) (No. 06-560).
402. See Rugen, supra note 364; Yates, supra note 384.
403. See supra notes 401-02.
404. Bahram Seyedin-Noor, Supreme Court Rejects "Scheme" Liability: Stone-
ridge Investment Partners LLC v. Scientific Atlanta Inc., 2008 ASPATORE INSTANT
AWARENESS 5 (2008).
405. Id.
406. Gregory G. Ballard, The Supreme Court's Decision in Stoneridge: The End of
"Scheme" Liability and Signs of What's to Come in Future Securities Litigation, 2008
ASPATORE INSTANT AWARENESS 5 (2008).
407. Id.
408. Yates, supra note 384.
2008]
UALR LAW REVIEW
not perceive it as an invitation to aid or abet fraud.4 The SEC retains
enforcement power to bring regulatory actions against secondary ac-
tors, and state and federal criminal regulatory sanctions remain as sig-
nificant deterrents for those that help issuing companies mislead in-
vestors.41 Additionally, the holding in Stoneridge sheds little light on
the liability of officers or professionals that play a significant role in
preparing an issuing company's financial statements, even though
their roles may be unknown to investors. 41  Nonetheless, commenta-
tors unanimously agree that Stoneridge represents a significant victory
to secondary actors in the securities markets.
412
C. Not So Fast
Although Stoneridge clearly limits the circumstances in which
federal courts may hold secondary actors liable under section 10(b)
and SEC Rule 10b-5, lower federal courts have historically alleviated
the harshness of the Supreme Court's approach to securities litigation
413by accepting alternative theories of recovery. Thus, creative plain-
tiffs' attorneys are likely to continue to develop fresh, novel theories
designed to circumvent the requirements necessary to establish prima-
409. Accountants/Attorneys: Supreme Court Limits Liability, 37 REAL EST. L. REP.
8 (2008).
410. Id.
411. Rugen, supra note 364. Although the holding clearly limits the circumstances
in which courts can hold secondary actors liable under section 10(b) and SEC Rule
10b-5, Stoneridge "draws a line that leaves a significant area of liability open to those
who more actively participate in the financial fraud." High Court Rejects 'Scheme
Liability' Under Antifraud Provisions of 1934 Act, supra note 379. The majority in
Stoneridge reasoned that Respondents were not liable because nothing they did made
it "necessary or inevitable" for Charter to record the transactions in the way in which
it did. Stoneridge Inv. Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761, 770 (2008).
Thus, an exception may exist if those who aid and abet securities fraud made the fraud
"necessary or inevitable." Barker, Baum, Jenkins, Ballard, Redburn & Seyedin-Noor,
supra note 10.
412. The significance of the holding in Stoneridge as to secondary actors is most
immediately apparent in light of the wave of litigation that has accompanied the melt-
down of the sub-prime mortgage industry. Rugen, supra note 364; see also Lambert &
Lepelstat, supra note 389. "Investment banks and other financial institutions played a
host of different roles in creating, distributing, and servicing [mortgaged-backed se-
curities], yet most never made any public statements that might for the basis of prima-
ry liability under [s]ection 10(b)." Rugen, supra note 364. In light of the holding in
Stoneridge, secondary actors in the sub-prime mortgage industry can now breathe a
little easier, knowing that plaintiffs' burden in bringing claims under section 10(b)
against secondary actors is nearly insurmountable absent some sort of public miss-
tatement. Rugen, supra note 364.
413. Luton, supra note 8, at 46-47.
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ry liability under section 10(b) and SEC Rule 10b-5. Although it is not
likely that plaintiffs will bring the same type of claims-for example,
claims like "scheme liability," which attempt to circumvent the re-
liance requirement-the massive amount of money at stake in securi-
ties class-actions, as well as the perilous financial condition of most
primary violators, will likely sustain the amount of litigation brought
in federal courts against secondary actors.414 Furthermore, it is also
likely that lower federal courts, discouraged by what they perceive as
inadequate protection afforded to sympathetic investors under the
current regulatory scheme, will accept these new theories as legitimate
or will at least allow these claims to survive a motion to dismiss.
Secondary actors, therefore, need not put their guards down. Un-
less Congress steps in and more adequately defines the scope of pri-
mary liability under section 10(b), secondary actors may face a wave
of lawsuits under alternative theories of liability. Given that these new
theories are likely to be different from the theory of "scheme liability"
put forth in Stoneridge and given the fact that federal courts have been
historically sympathetic to alternative theories of liability under sec-
tion 10(b) and SEC Rule 10b-5, secondary actors may find it difficult
to dismiss these suits for failure to state a claim. If the plaintiffs' bar is
creative enough to concoct theories that enable plaintiffs to survive
motions to dismiss, these theories are likely to force defendants to
continue to settle lawsuits, and money will continue to flow to the
plaintiffs' class-action bar.415
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